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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of
commercial property non-recourse loan contracts. We employ commercial zoning regulation to
capture the flexibility of a property's permitted uses as a measure of an asset's redeployability or
value in its next best use. Within a census tract, more redeployable assets receive larger loans with
longer maturities and durations, lower interest rates, and fewer creditors, controlling for the current
value of the property, its type, and neighborhood. These results are consistent with incomplete
contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure.
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How do liquidation values aﬀect ﬁnancial contracts? An extensive theoretical literature examines
this question (Williamson (1988), Harris and Raviv (1990), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), Hart and Moore (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Diamond (2004))
and concludes that optimal debt policy critically depends on how costly it is for creditors to seize
and liquidate assets. However, empirical evidence on this question is scarce, due to the diﬃculty
in obtaining a measure of an asset’s liquidation value or value in its next best use. We provide
empirical evidence on the link between liquidation value and debt contracts using a unique sample
of commercial property loans and variation in property zoning ordinances.
Liquidation value is of central importance for ﬁnancial decisions when contracts are incomplete
and transaction costs exist, as noted by Williamson (1985, 1988), Grossman and Hart (1986), and
Hart and Moore (1990). In particular, debt contracts allow the creditor to seize the debtor’s assets
when the latter fails to make a promised payment. The liquidation value of the asset establishes
the creditor’s outside option and thereby determines his bargaining power relative to that of the
debtor, making foreclosure threats more or less credible and aﬀecting the incentives of both parties
to invest in the enterprise. Hart (1995) emphasizes the importance of allocating control rights and
seizure of assets as a credible threat in determining the ﬁnancial contract between an entrepreneur
and outside investors. Since the entrepreneur cannot commit to not withdraw his human capital
from the project (as in Hart and Moore (1994)), or to not divert cash ﬂows to himself (as in Hart
and Moore (1989) and Aghion and Bolton (1992)), creditors will agree to lend only if the debt is
secured by the project’s assets and default triggers its liquidation.
Despite the broad implications of these theories and their appealing intuitions, supporting
evidence is sparse. Testing the theories requires data on both debt contracts and the characteristics
of the assets that are used to secure the debt. In particular, the econometrician must observe the
liquidation value of the asset, but it is diﬃcult to ascertain ex ante, when the parties enter the debt
contract, what the proceeds from selling the asset to the next user might be. As a proxy for the
ex ante value of the asset in its next best use, we employ property-speciﬁc zoning assignments to
capture micro-level variation in liquidation values.
The real estate market is a natural candidate for testing ﬁnancial contracting from an incomplete
contracting perspective. First, commercial property loans are secured, emphasizing the importance
1of liquidation values for ﬁnancial contracting. Second, the loans are non-recourse, thus providing
a set of project-speciﬁc ﬁnancings and characteristics consistent with the inalienability of human
capital described by Hart and Moore (1994) and other models. Finally, the real estate market
oﬀers a potential measure of an asset’s liquidation value through zoning ordinances which govern
the permitted uses of a property.
This empirical approach is motivated by Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) hypothesis that regulation
determines the number of potential buyers in the market. A broader set of buyers can potentially
raise the liquidation value of an asset. Since zoning regulations determine the set of uses to which
a property may be put, we exploit variation in zoning at the property level to generate a measure
of liquidation value. We consider the intensity and scope with which one can use a property within
its broad zoning category and within i t sl o c a lz o n i n gj u r i s d i c t i o n .T h i sr e s t r i c t i o ng o v e r n st h es e t
of potential alternative uses for an asset. Properties with more allowable uses should have a greater
number of potential buyers, all else equal, and therefore a higher value in the event of liquidation.
This is a measure of the asset’s redeployability in the sense of Williamson (1988) and we adopt the
same terminology.
We recognize that the current value of the asset is also likely to be aﬀected by redeployabil-
ity and, more speciﬁcally, zoning, which in turn may be aﬀected by local market unobservables.
However, we argue that endogeneity concerns over the price-zoning relation (Glaeser and Gyourko
(2002) and McMillen and McDonald (2002)) are less relevant for our study of debt contracts for
several reasons. First, the potential endogeneity of zoning typically refers to the relation between
local market conditions and the local zoning code at the jurisdiction or city level. We examine
property-speciﬁc zoning assignments within a neighborhood, controlling for local economic vari-
ables. We also employ property type, year, and general zoning category ﬁxed eﬀects. In many of
our tests we employ census tract level ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀerence out the unobservables. A census
tract typically covers between 2,500 and 8,000 persons or about a 4 square block area in most cities,
and is designed to be homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and
living conditions (source: U.S. Census Bureau). Since zoning regulation is set at a much broader
level, either city or municipality, census tract ﬁxed eﬀects eliminate any unobservables possibly
aﬀecting the local zoning code. Fixed eﬀects at a level this ﬁne also eliminate the inﬂuence of any
plausible unobserved neighborhood variable such as local “quality” or degree of bank redlining.
In addition, because census tracts are designed to capture population and economic homogeneity,
2using tract ﬁxed eﬀects also controls for the characteristics of buyers and sellers at this level. Hence,
tract ﬁxed eﬀects should alleviate endogeneity concerns over the relation between zoning and local
unobservables. Second, we focus on the characteristics of the debt contracts controlling for the
current value of the property. The current value of the property captures all of the relevant local
and other variables that aﬀect value under its current use. By controlling for current value we
attempt to isolate the component of redeployability related to its secondary or liquidation value.
This likely understates the impact of our measure. Consistent with this, results are magniﬁed when
removing controls for current value.
We ﬁnd that, controlling for current value, property type, general zoning type, year, and census
tract ﬁxed eﬀects, greater redeployability is associated with greater loan size, lower interest rates,
longer maturity and longer duration debt, and fewer creditors. These results highlight the economic
importance of liquidation value and provide support for incomplete contracting and transaction cost
theories for ﬁnancial policy. Within a census tract, property type, and general zoning category, and
controlling for current price, moving from the least to the average (most) zoning ﬂexibility lowers
the interest loan rate by 27 (57) basis points per annum, increases the loan’s size relative to the
value of the property by 5.9 (12.6) percentage points, lengthens the loan’s maturity by 2.8 (6.1)
years, increases the loan’s duration by 0.17 (0.37) years, and decreases the probability of borrowing
from multiple lenders by 3.6 (7.6) percentage points.
We also ﬁnd that these eﬀects are magniﬁed in districts in which survey evidence (from the
Wharton Land Use Control Survey) suggests zoning rules are administered more strictly and in
jurisdictions with stronger overall law enforcement. In areas where zoning is more diﬃcult to change
a n dm o r es t r o n g l ye n f o r c e da n da d h e r e dt o ,o u rr e d e p l o y a b i l i t ym e a s u r eh a sa ne v e ng r e a t e ri m p a c t
on the terms of loan contracts. Likewise, for individual properties that appear more diﬃcult to
obtain zoning changes, such as historic properties or properties zoned similar to their neighbors,
we ﬁnd the eﬀects of our redeployability measure on debt contracts to be stronger. Finally, we also
ﬁnd that interactions between redeployability and measures of local market liquidity, such as the
competitiveness of the local brokerage market or survey responses on demand for land uses relative
to the supply of land zoned for those uses, enhance the importance of redeployability on debt terms.
For robustness, we also employ other, perhaps more endogenous, measures of liquidation value
such as the competitiveness of the local property brokerage market, location in an “historical”
zoning district, the volume of property sales in an area, the similarity of a property’s zoning to
3its neighbors, population density, and property age. The results using these proxies generally
support our primary ﬁndings: higher liquidation value decreases interest rates and the probability
of multiple lenders and increases the probability of obtaining a loan, its relative size, maturity, and
duration.
Finally, we also examine the relation between our redeployability measure and other outcome
variables associated with liquidation values. For instance, we ﬁnd that more redeployable properties
do indeed enjoy higher market prices and that sellers of more redeployable properties are less likely
to hire professional brokers to market their properties. While we interpret these results with caution
due to greater endogeneity concerns, particularly with respect to price, these ﬁndings are consistent
with our ﬂexibility of zoning measure capturing liquidation value.
Earlier empirical studies analyze some of the implications of incomplete contracting for ﬁnancial
structure, but typically do not focus on liquidation value, which plays a prominent role in the
theory. Baker and Hubbard (2001, 2003) provide some evidence on the relation between asset
ownership and contractibility, but do not examine ﬁnancial contracts or redeployability. Kaplan
and Stromberg (2002) show that the structure of many venture capital contracts is consistent with
the allocation of control rights in incomplete contracts, but they too do not examine the role of
liquidation value. There is also little direct evidence on the importance of transaction costs to
capital structure (Gilson (1997)).
Previous research has examined the existence of ineﬃcient liquidation or “ﬁre sales” (Pulvino
(1998, 1999), Stromberg (2000)), but not the interplay between ex ante liquidation value and
ﬁnancial structure at the time the contract is set. Other studies examine the relation between
balance-sheet ﬁgures such as tangibility (e.g., the ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets) and capital
structure, (Braun (2003), Harris and Raviv (1991), and Rajan and Zingales (1995)), but it is not
clear that such proxies capture liquidation value or the asset value in its next best use. Benmelech
(2003) analyzes the relation between asset salability and capital structure among 19th century
American railroads. Using variation in the track gauge across railroads, he ﬁnds that railroads
with more redeployable cars and that conformed to the standard gauge had longer maturity debt,
complementing our evidence. He ﬁnds, however, no relation between asset salability and leverage.
In addition, little evidence on the relation between the number of creditors and liquidation val-
ues exists. Several recent papers study the relation between cross-country diﬀerences in creditors
protection and the number of banking relationships (Ongena and Smith (2000), Esty and Meg-
4ginson (2003), and Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000)). We provide micro-level evidence to
complement these cross-country comparisons of creditor protection and legal systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes theoretical predictions on
the relation between liquidation value and ﬁnancial contracting. Section II details the commercial
loan data and local zoning regulations used in our analysis and describes the empirical strategy
we employ to measure changes in liquidation value through zoning laws. Section III presents our
empirical results on the eﬀect of asset liquidation value through zoning on debt contracts. Section
IV examines the impact of other measures of asset liquidation value on loan terms and Section
V presents additional evidence relating liquidation values to prices and broker activity. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Theoretical Predictions
In several inﬂuential theories of ﬁnancial contracting, asset liquidation value is a central determinant
of the optimal capital structure used to ﬁnance an investment. In this section we provide a brief
overview of these theories, detail their predictions, and describe how these predictions ﬁto u rs a m p l e
of commercial loan contracts.
A. Liquidation value and ﬁnancial contracts
Williamson’s (1988) transaction cost approach emphasizes that asset characteristics are a critical
feature in determining the optimal ﬁnancing of a project. In particular, debt is an unforgiving,
rules-based claim that will require liquidation in adverse states. Assets that are redeployable (i.e.,
assets that are not specialized and that have valuable other uses) will be particularly suited to
debt ﬁnancing. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) focus instead on the eﬀects of asset illiquidity.I nt h e i r
industry-equilibrium model, assets with few potential buyers, or with potential buyers who are
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained when a ﬁrm attempts liquidation, will be poor candidates for
debt ﬁnance, since liquidation is likely to yield a low price.
Harris and Raviv (1990) analyze the information eﬀects of debt. Debt can facilitate eﬃcient
liquidation since managers who miss payments are forced to reveal information to creditors, and
in default creditors will choose to liquidate the ﬁrm if that yields more than a reorganization.
Managers are assumed to always prefer to avoid liquidation. In Hart and Moore (1994), contractual
incompleteness and the non-veriﬁability of cash ﬂows limit the ability of creditors to make claims
5on the ﬁrm. Creditors do retain the option, however, to liquidate the assets of the ﬁrm. The greater
the liquidation value of the assets, the more creditors are willing to lend, since they are assured of
a higher payment. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) consider the optimal number of creditors. They
argue that borrowing from multiple creditors can make default costly, which disciplines managers
but may lead to ineﬃcient outcomes when default is involuntary. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
show that borrowing from one creditor is optimal when liquidation values are high since the absolute
costs of ineﬃcient liquidation are high in that case. When liquidation values are low, multiple
creditors provide discipline at little cost in forgone liquidation payments. Diamond (2004) makes
a similar prediction when lender intervention is costly.
The concept of liquidation value used in the Harris and Raviv (1990), Hart and Moore (1994),
and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) models is fairly general: an asset’s liquidation value is the
amount that creditors can expect to receive if they seize the asset from managers and sell it on the
open market. Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) consider two diﬀerent components
of liquidation value. Williamson (1988) analyzes asset redeployability, while Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) study asset illiquidity. In our empirical work we propose a speciﬁc proxy for redeployability,
using zoning regulations, and examine its impact on ﬁnancial contracts. For robustness, we also
employ other proxies for liquidity and ﬁnd similar eﬀects.
The models discussed above yield the following empirical predictions:
Prediction 1. Debt levels increase in asset liquidation value.
This is a general prediction emerging from Williamson (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Harris
and Raviv (1990), and Hart and Moore (1994). Debt triggers liquidation in some states in all these
models, and the beneﬁts of debt are tied to the eﬃciency of liquidation.
Prediction 1b. The promised debt yield decreases in asset liquidation value, controlling for
the debt level.
Following Prediction 1, increased liquidation value lowers the cost of liquidation. In equilibrium,
lenders therefore charge lower interest rates on loans made on assets with higher liquidation value,
controlling for the debt level. This is in part why optimal debt levels also rise (Prediction 1).
Prediction 2. Debt maturity increases in asset liquidation value.
Prediction 2 emerges from Hart and Moore (1994) and from Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Hart
6and Moore (1994) argue that a higher proﬁle of liquidation values over time increases the asset’s
durability and makes longer maturity debt feasible. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) analyze the trade-oﬀ
between the beneﬁt of debt overhang in constraining management and liquidation costs. Benm-
elech (2003) shows that higher liquidation values make overhang (long-term) debt more attractive.
Since debt overhang limits managers’ ability to bypass short-term debt constraints, long-term debt
capacity increases with liquidation value. Thus, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predict an increase in
debt maturity with liquidation value. Although some of these theories only consider zero-coupon
debt, a reasonable extrapolation yields the implication that debt duration will also increase in
liquidation value.
Prediction 3. Firms borrow from multiple creditors when liquidation value is low and from a
single creditor when liquidation value is high.
This is a prediction of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Diamond (2004). Multiple creditors
provide discipline at the cost of ineﬃcient liquidation.1
Prediction 4. The promised debt yield is increasing in asset liquidation value.
An increase in the liquidation value of the asset raises the optimal debt level but also provides
a greater payment to creditors. The net eﬀect on promised debt yields is analytically ambiguous,
but in numerical results Harris and Raviv (1990) show that ﬁrms with higher liquidation values
consistently have higher debt yields. Prediction 1b shows that when controlling for the debt level
of the ﬁrm, by contrast, higher liquidation values should be associated with lower promised yields,
s i n c ec r e d i t o r sc a ne x p e c tah i g h e rp a y m e n ti nt h ec a s eo fd e f a u l t .
Prediction 5. The market value of the asset is increasing in its liquidation value.
Since the liquidation value of the asset is a component of its overall value, increasing the
liquidation value increases total asset value. This natural prediction comes from Harris and Raviv
(1990). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) make a prediction about the existence of asset “ﬁre
sales” in liquidation, which is also consistent with market values increasing with liquidation values.
1A distinction between Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Diamond (2004) can be made regarding the priority or
seniority of creditors. In Diamond’s (2004) model, externalities among creditors drive this prediction, where priority
can be viewed as an externality. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) lenders have the same priority. Unfortunately, our
data do not allow us to distinguish whether multiple creditors or priority among creditors is more important since
second lenders uniformly have lower priority claim on the assets in our sample.
7B. Application to commercial real assets
In order to test these implications we employ a unique dataset of commercial property transac-
tions and ﬁnancial contracts and use property-speciﬁc zoning assignments to capture variation in
liquidation value. Some discussion of the relation between the data and the models is in order.
Commercial property loans are secured, highlighting the potential importance of liquidation
value, and are typically non-recourse (Stein (1997)). The lender may only pursue the collateral,
in this case the property, and not any other assets of the borrower in case of default. The non-
recourse feature of these loans therefore allows for a clean analysis of project-speciﬁc ﬁnancing and
its relation to the asset’s characteristics, namely its liquidation value. Many of the aforementioned
models are motivated or can be interpreted in this spirit. Indeed, the non-recourse nature of the
loans makes the value of collateral critical for ﬁnancial contracting, and therefore well-suited to
testing the theories. In addition, examining variation in ﬁnancial contracts within a particular
asset class also helps to reduce confounding inﬂuences such as control issues, cash ﬂow rights,
risk, industry competitiveness, etc. that may arise when examining contracts across vastly diﬀerent
assets, projects, or investments. Finally, we will argue in the next section that the use of property-
speciﬁc zoning assignments within a neighborhood can capture micro-level variation in liquidation
values used to test the predictions of these models.
II. Data and Empirical Strategy
We brieﬂy describe the data sources used in the paper and our identiﬁcation strategy for capturing
asset liquidation value.
A. Transaction and ﬁnancing level data of commercial real assets
Our sample consists of commercial real asset transactions drawn from across the U.S. over the period
January 1, 1992 to March 30, 1999 from COMPS.com, a leading provider of commercial real estate
sales data. COMPS collects data on commercial transactions by contacting buyers, sellers, and
brokers, and then conﬁrms their reports with each of these parties. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003,
2004a) provide an extensive description of the COMPS database and detailed summary statistics.
There are 14,159 commercial transactions reported over our sample period that contain recorded
sale price, loan terms, information on lenders, identities of principals, property location, and zoning
8designation. The data span 11 states: California, Nevada, Oregon, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Virginia, Texas, Georgia, New York, Illinois, and Colorado, plus the District of Columbia.
COMPS records for each property transaction the sale price, speciﬁc zoning designation (de-
scribed below), and terms of the loan contract at the time of sale. Hence, we see the property’s
market value, zoning designation, and loan terms at the time when the loan contract is negotiated.
As documented by Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003, 2004a) debt ﬁnancing dominates the ﬁnancial
structure of commercial properties, comprising 71% of the property’s value on average. In addition
to cash, the remaining source of funds typically comes from the seller, known as vendor-to-buyer
ﬁnancing, in the form of a debt contract. These occur in about 13% of transactions and are typi-
cally junior to bank loans. For more discussion of the role of seller ﬁnancing and the tradeoﬀ with
bank debt, see Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004a). Properties can have ﬁrst and second trust deeds
(mortgages), where the latter has lower priority claim on the real asset. We use the presence of
second trusts from another lender to capture multiple creditors in our analysis.
Finally, in only 2% of deals does a buyer assume an existing mortgage from a bank rather than
negotiate a new loan. We focus on the terms of new loan contracts, including interest rates and
maturity, and the size and presence of bank debt.
COMPS also provides eight digit latitude and longitude coordinates of the property’s location
(accurate to within 10 meters). From these, we construct characteristics of the local market in
which each property resides using Census data, survey data from the Wharton Land Use Control
S u r v e y ,a n dc r i m er a t ed a t a .
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the properties in our sample. Panel A shows that the
average sale price is $2.4 million, though values range from $20,000 to $750 million.2 The average
loan-to-value ratio (when debt is present) is 71%, with 71% of properties having at least some debt
and 12% having more than one creditor. Median loan maturity is 15 years and interest rates average
8.3 (and range from 5 to 11.75) percent per annum. Other recorded details of the loan contract are
whether the loan rate is ﬂoating or ﬁxed, whether amortized and the length of amortization, and
whether the loan was backed by the Small Business Administration (occurring only 1.3 percent of
the time). We will control for these features in our analysis. We also use the reported interest rate
(r), loan maturity (m) and amortization period (a) to estimate the duration of the loan. Assuming
2Larger portfolios of properties such as REITS comprise only 42 transactions total, which is less than 0.2 percent
of the sample.
9that the debt coupons are paid annually and that there is one ﬁnal balloon payment at maturity,



















The median loan duration is 6.8 years. The mean age of our properties is just under 29 years,
but ranges from zero to 200 years. Overall, the properties in the data set are relatively small and
old compared with institutional quality real estate. (See, for example, Titman, Tompaidis, and
Tsyplakov, 2004.) These properties are particularly appropriate for tests of the role of liquidation
value since the real option to liquidate the asset (for example, by knocking it down and constructing
something new) is more important for older and lower quality buildings than it is for new, high-
quality structures.
B. Zoning designations
We see 161 unique zoning designations among our properties. Zoning regulations are controlled by
local units of the government and are designed to manage the physical development of land and
the uses to which each individual property may be put. Zoning rules typically specify the areas in
which residential, commercial, industrial, or recreational activities may take place. In addition to
restricting the permitted uses that can be made of land and buildings, zoning laws also regulate
property characteristics. For example, they may limit the permitted size of the building relative
to the size of the lot, the number of dwelling units permitted on the lot, the maximum height and
number of stories, or the industrial nature and intensity of use of the property. Since zoning is
al o c a la ﬀair, set at the county, city, or municipality level, its ordinances and classiﬁcations vary
from place to place. Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) discuss the determination of zoning in an area
and its conformity to local market conditions. However, our zoning tests will make use of variation
in zoning designations within a given jurisdiction, and hence control for local market conditions
potentially aﬀecting the zoning code.
Zoning deﬁnitions are typically nested and classiﬁed along two facets. The ﬁrst dimension spans
the breadth of permitted uses. The most common categories of this dimension in urban areas are:
business, commercial, manufacturing, commercial-manufacturing, and residential. Other categories
include: waterfront, organizations and non-for-proﬁts, and historical and cultural preservation
10districts. Panel A of Table 1 reports loan and property characteristics across these categories. The
second dimension of zoning determines the intensity and scope of the allowable use of the property
within its broad category. It is typically denoted by a numeric scale, while an alphabetic modiﬁer
describes the zoning category. Table A1 provides an example of the residential zoning codes in
New York city. We term the numerical intensity the “within zoning value.” Higher values indicate
broader scopes of allowable uses within its general category. The last column of Table 1 Panel
A reports the number of unique zoning codes within each broad zoning category. We will exploit
the nested nature of the zoning code for our measure of redeployability within a general zoning
category and within a local zoning jurisdiction and census tract, described in the next subsection.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of property types, grouped into 10 mutually exclu-
sive types: retail, commercial, industrial, apartment, mobile home park, special, residential land,
industrial land, oﬃce, and hotel, across the eight broad zoning categories. As Panel B indicates,
many diﬀerent property types are represented in each broad zoning category, indicating multiple
uses of properties. Panel C reports loan and price information across property types. We will
control for both property type and general zoning category in our analysis thereby deﬁning our
liquidation value measure within type and zoning category.
C. Using zoning regulations to measure liquidation values
Testing the theoretical predictions discussed in Section I requires a measure of liquidation value
that is both observable at the time of the loan contract determination and plausibly independent
of other factors that may inﬂuence ﬁnancial contracts.
C.1 Measuring redeployability (through zoning)
Using the zoning designation of each property at the time of sale, we exploit variation within an
area and zoning category in terms of the ﬂexibility of permitted uses of the property. Our proxy
of liquidation value is a measure of the property’s redeployability or zoning ﬂexibility within its
general zoning category. Properties with more ﬂexible zoning designations admit more potential
uses and are more redeployable. Creditors who seize a property subject to restrictive zoning will
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to pursue alternative uses for the structure or land, whereas creditors who foreclose
on a property that is only loosely zoned can redeploy the asset in many diﬀerent ways.
Using the nested nature of zoning deﬁnitions, we construct a measure of the ﬂexibility of use of a
11property relative to that of other properties in the same zoning category and neighborhood. More
formally, for every broad zoning category, we rank properties on their second zoning dimension
(the “within numeric value”) governing the intensity and scope of allowable uses within the general
zoning category. Higher values indicate more allowable uses (greater ﬂexibility). To illustrate the
dimensions of zoning and how we compute our measure of redeployability, consider the case of
residential zoning districts in New York city.
According to the NYC Zoning handbook, there are 18 diﬀerent zoning districts within the
residential category. Table A1 in the appendix provides a detailed description of each of the
residential zoning districts in NYC and a summary of their permitted uses. As demonstrated in
Table A1, the allowable uses within the general residential zoning category are increasing with the
zoning district numeric scale. For example, the R-1 zoning district requires a minimum area of
9,500 square feet for detached structures, while the R-2 (R-4) zoning district allows for a minimum
lot area of 3,800 (970) square feet. Moreover, while the R-4 zoning district permits that the land
will be used for semi-detached structures with a minimum area of 1,700 square feet, the R-2 zoning
district allows only detached single- or two-family residences. In addition, the maximum number of
dwelling units per acre in R-2 is 11, while R-4 allows for up to 45 dwelling units per acre. As this
example demonstrates, the NYC R-4 zoning designation is more ﬂexible and has more allowable
uses than R-3, which has more than R-2, and which in turn has more than R-1. The higher the
numeric code, the fewer constraints placed on property uses.
To construct our redeployability measure, we extract the numeric “within value” to capture
redeployability within each broad zoning category. For comparison across locales and zoning cat-
egory, we then scale the within zoning numeric value by the numeric value of the zoning district
with maximum allowable uses within its broad category. For example, a zoning district of M-1
is ﬁrst coded by a manufacturing dummy variable that is set equal to 1, and a redeployability
variable within this category. If the manufacturing zoning districts for a particular locale are:
M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4 then the within redeployability value of a property zoned M-1 will equal
0.25. Furthermore, when modiﬁers are used in zoning districts we reﬁne the within numeric values
further such that they account for this sub-division. For example, given the following residential
zoning districts: R-1, R-2A, R-2B, R-2C, and R-3, the within numeric value of R-2C will be 2.67
and its scaled value, which is our measure of redeployability, will equal 2.67/3.0=0.89. Scaling
the raw within zoning value for the range of allowable uses in a given area normalizes the local
12zoning assignments across jurisdictions. For property p with zoning designation A-n in jurisdiction
j,t h i si s n
max(n∈P(A,j)),w h e r eP(A,j) is the set of properties within jurisdiction j that have the same
general zoning category A. The local zoning jurisdiction j can vary across locales, but results are
robust to uniformly deﬁning j to be the zip code, 2 mile radius, 5 mile radius, county, or MSA. For
convenience and uniformity we report results deﬁning locales at the zip code level.
Our measure of redeployability arbitrarily treats each within numeric value equally. This is
done for simplicity and ease of interpretability. However, it is evident from Table A1 that moving
f r o ms a yR - 1t oR - 2i sl e s ss i g n i ﬁcant than moving from R-2 to R-3 along certain dimensions.
Hence, an alternative redeployability measure could attempt to account for such nonlinearities.
We do not do this for several reasons. First, we do not have detailed descriptions of every single
zoning ordinance along every property dimension in every city/jurisdiction. Second, any attempt to
account for these nonlinearities would also be arbitrary and subjective. Third, although the linear
speciﬁcation we adopt likely mismeasures the true redeployability/ﬂexibility of use of a property,
thus introducing noise into our analysis, we see no reason to expect any bias in this speciﬁcation that
would aﬀect any relation to loan contract terms. Finally, and most importantly, we have formally
tested whether nonlinearities are important for our results using a nonparametric speciﬁcation
where we employ dummy variables for every unique redeployability value in our sample. For all
seven of the dependent variables we examine (6 loan terms and price) nonlinear terms are rejected
in favor of a linear speciﬁcation. We describe these tests and their results in more detail under the
robustness section of III.B.4.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of our redeployability measure across all properties in our sample.
The mean (median) scaled ﬂexibility measure is 0.51 (0.50) with a standard deviation of 0.24 and
ranges from 0.08 to 1.
C.2 Are zoning designations a useful measure of liquidation value?
There are two concerns with our use of a property’s zoning designation as a measure of liquidation
value. First, there is the question of whether zoning laws are actually enforced and how easy it
is to acquire a zoning variance. Second, there is the issue of endogeneity; it may be argued that
zoning assignments are made ex post to conform to market conditions.
With respect to the ﬁrst question, rezoning a property or obtaining a variance is typically quite
diﬃcult. While the direct costs of a rezoning application are low, usually only a few hundred dollars,
13the indirect costs can be substantial, the waiting duration lengthy, and the outcome uncertain. Some
cities are reluctant to rezone properties at all. For example, the Baltimore City (which is in our
sample) Department of Planning asserts that:
“The existing zoning category is presumed to be correct. Rezoning property is a sig-
niﬁcant step and must meet stringent criteria in accordance with State regulations...The
goal of zoning is to insure stability and rezoning property has the potential to alter the
stability of an area.”
Signiﬁcant zoning changes impose externalities on neighboring properties. Rezoning a block of
townhouses into a ten-story building aﬀects the value of neighboring townhouses, obstructs their
view, and limits the amount of available parking in the street. Furthermore, long-term planning,
development engineering, ﬁr es a f e t y ,c r i m e ,e n v i r o n m e n t a li s s u e s ,a n dp r e s e r v a t i o ne ﬀorts are ex-
amples of considerations that the local authority has to take into account when deciding upon
rezoning. In addition, local planning commissions usually conduct public hearings to allow inter-
ested parties to speak for or against a rezoning proposal. A protest period typically begins after
the public hearing and allows involved parties to ﬁle legal protest petitions against the request. In
addition, when a rezoning request is denied, some cities require a waiting period of a year before a
revised application can be made. This makes clear that acquiring a zoning variance is not trivial
and is likely to be quite diﬃcult.
This issue is, in any case, an empirical one. The evidence that we ﬁnd in support of the
eﬀects of zoning on debt contracts, including interest rates and number of creditors, suggests
that zoning restrictions certainly do sometimes bind. Moreover, we ﬁnd that these eﬀects are
magniﬁed in districts where zoning rules are administered more strictly and where the quality of
zoning enforceability is higher. Since these areas enforce zoning restrictions more tightly or make
it more diﬃcult to change, zoning will provide a better measure of liquidation value in these areas.
Likewise, for individual properties that appear more diﬃcult to obtain zoning changes, such as
historically zoned properties or properties zoned similar to their neighbors, we ﬁnd the eﬀects of
our redeployability measure to be stronger.
The second issue of endogeneity is taken up in the real estate literature (e.g., McMillen and
McDonald (1991), Quigley and Rosenthal (2004), and Wallace (1988)), and there is evidence that
14local market conditions can aﬀect the general zoning of an area.3 Property-speciﬁcz o n i n gd e s -
ignations, relative to other properties in the same neighborhood, are less likely to be subject to
this endogeneity problem, however. In particular, for many of our tests we employ census tract
ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀerence out the unobservables. Fixed eﬀects at this ﬁne a level eliminate any
local neighborhood characteristics and are ﬁner than the level at which the zoning code is being set
(typically the city). In addition, we employ ﬁxed eﬀects for property type, year, neighborhood, and
general zoning category to diﬀerence out unobservables at these levels. Finally, the primary focus of
our paper is on the implications of zoning for debt structure, where we control for the current value
of the property. Local debt market conditions are clearly highly uniform within neighborhoods
(particularly census tracts) so the ﬁnancing environment is unlikely to be driving the micro-level
zoning variation we study. Moreover, by controlling for current value, we attempt to isolate the
component of our redeployability measure related to liquidation value. Variables aﬀecting value
and zoning simultaneously will be captured by current value and will, therefore, if anything, under-
state the eﬀect of our zoning variable on loan terms. Potential omitted variables aﬀecting zoning
and ﬁnancing on a speciﬁc property within a census tract, type, year, and zoning category and
controlling for current value, are diﬃcult to envision. This suggests that zoning ﬂexibility (relative
to current value, neighborhood, and zoning category) is a reasonable measure of liquidation value.
III. Empirical Results of Redeployability (Through Zoning)
Using our zoning classiﬁcation proxies for liquidation value, we test the predictions of the models
from Section I.
A. Econometric model
Our econometric model considers the eﬀect of our redeployability variables on the following loan
characteristics: annual interest rate, frequency (i.e., whether or not a loan is granted, a binary
variable), leverage (loan size divided by the sale price), loan maturity in years, loan duration in
years, and presence of multiple creditors (a binary variable). The equation estimated is
loan characteristici = F(redeployabilityi,currentvalue i,controlsi)+6i, (2)
3Some useful references on the relationship between zoning and prices are Pogodzinski and Sass (1991), Pollakowski
and Wachter (1990), Glaeser and Gyourko (2002), and McMillen and McDonald (2002).
15where controlsi is a vector of controls containing a set of property and neighborhood attributes for
asset i including year, census tract, property type, and zoning category ﬁxed eﬀects and 6i is an
error term. We mainly estimate linear models, though other functional forms are considered for
the binary dependent variables. We also test whether a non-linear functional form better describes
the data and reject non-linearities in favor of a linear speciﬁcation.
In advance of our discussion of the empirical results, it is worthwhile to consider the econometric
issues raised by our speciﬁcation in equation (2). The ﬁrst point is that the current value itself
may be a function of the redeployability variable; we would expect more redeployable properties
to realize higher prices and, indeed, we provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis in Section V.
This dependence of sale price on redeployability presents no special problem for the estimation of
(2) and is accommodated by standard econometric techniques.
A second possibility is that the current value is higher when ﬁnance is provided. The buyer
may be able to oﬀer a higher price when he receives a bank loan. In this case, current value
is an endogenous variable in equation (2). We are interested, however, only in the eﬀects of
redeployability (through zoning) on loan characteristics. The coeﬃcient on redeployability remains
consistent even when another regressor such as sale price is endogenous (Wooldridge, 2002).4 The
coeﬃcient on current value is not consistent in this case, but we are not interested in interpreting
this coeﬃcient.
The third, and most serious, concern is that some unobservable variable (such as bank redlining)
has a simultaneous eﬀect on loan provision, sale prices, and zoning regulations, rendering all of our
variables endogenous and diﬃcult to interpret. In all our tests, however, we measure redeployability
within a zoning category and employ extensive controls including local economic variables and ﬁxed
eﬀects for year, zoning category, and property type. We adopt two approaches to deal with potential
endogeneity. The ﬁrst is to use a host of local economic and social control variables measured at the
zip code or census tract level to soak up endogenous correlation. In this speciﬁcation we also employ
ar a n d o me ﬀects model that computes standard errors that account for group-wise clustering at
t h ez i pc o d el e v e l . I nt h es e c o n da p p r o a c hw ee m p l o yc e n s u st r a c tﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀerence out
the unobservables. This will account for any unobservables, such as local “quality”, at a very ﬁne
geographic level. It is unlikely that within a census tract, which consists of about a four square
4Although there may be some issues in small samples, given our relatively large sample size (as detailed in Table
1), it is reasonable for us to rely on asymptotic results.
16block area in a city, variation in some unobserved variable is jointly determining the ﬁnancing
environment and zoning designations. Moreover, since zoning regulation is set at the much broader
city or municipality level, census tract ﬁxed eﬀects eliminate any unobservables possibly aﬀecting
the local zoning code.
Alternatively, unobservable variables may be property-speciﬁc, for example a characteristic of
the buyer. It is highly unlikely, however, given the stability of zoning classiﬁcations, that any
buyer characteristic could aﬀect the zoning of a property a tt h et i m eo fs a l e . Moreover, because
census tracts are designed to capture population and economic homogeneity, using tract ﬁxed
eﬀects helps control for characteristics of buyers and sellers. In addition, as we argue above,
controlling for the current value of the property should remove the eﬀects of any other property-
speciﬁc idiosyncrasies (or other local eﬀe c t s )t h a tm i g h ti n ﬂuence both the terms of ﬁnancing and
the zoning classiﬁcation of the property.5 Although controlling for current value likely understates
the impact of redeployability, it soaks up unobservables aﬀecting value under the property’s current
use.
We note here that we are essentially estimating reduced form equations for the price, quantity,
and terms of the debt supplied. This is ﬁne since we are only interested in testing the equilibrium
outcomes and implications proposed by the theories in Section I. We do not show whether the
results are driven by demand- or supply-side eﬀects. While it would be interesting to diﬀerentiate
between theories by distinguishing demand and supply shocks,6 our data are insuﬃciently rich for
us to do so since they describe only equilibrium outcomes. Hence, we can only say whether the
results are consistent with these theories in general, but cannot distinguish among them.
B. Asset redeployability (ﬂexibility of zoning)
We examine the eﬀect of our redeployability variables (i.e., greater zoning ﬂexibility) on various
loan contract terms.
5We note that previous empirical work shows that higher “quality” areas are associated with restrictive zoning
(Quigley and Rosenthal (2004)), while we ﬁnd, by contrast, that it is ﬂexible zoning that predicts greater loan
provision. Thus, it is diﬃcult to argue that “quality” eﬀects are driving our results.
6For example, in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) less debt is demanded by the asset owner as the liquidation value
falls, while in Hart and Moore (1994) the creditor is willing to supply less debt for lower liquidation values.
17B.1 Local economic and social controls
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 Panel A reports results for the regression of the loan interest rate
on our redeployability measure, the current value of the property, and a set of controls. We
employ the log of the sale price as a scale measure for size and use the capitalization rate on the
property (current earnings divided by sale price) as a measure of current value. We discuss in
the next subsection the robustness of our results to alternative speciﬁcations for current value.
In addition to ﬁxed eﬀects for year, property type, county, and zoning category, we include the
Herﬁndahl index of banking concentration within a 15-mile radius of the property (a measure of
local bank competition for commercial loans), the log of property age, the cross-sectional variation
in capitalization rates within a 15-mile radius, excluding the property itself (a measure of local
price variation), characteristics of the census tract in which the property is located including levels
and growth in population, per capita income, and median home value from 1990 to 2000, and
the 1995 crime risk and growth in crime risk from 1990 to 1995.7 Since crime has been linked to
property values (Thaler (1978) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004b)) and ﬁnancing (Garmaise and
Moskowitz (2004b)), we add this as an additional control. In addition, for the loan rate regressions
only, we also include attributes of the loan such as maturity, amortization, leverage, and dummies
for ﬂoating rate loans and Small-Business-Administration-backed (SBA) loans, since these features
likely aﬀect the loan interest rate. Standard errors are calculated assuming group-wise clustering
at the zip code level.8
We ﬁnd that redeployability signiﬁcantly decreases the interest rate charged, controlling for the
debt level. A reasonable way to gauge economic signiﬁcance is to consider the eﬀect from moving
from the least-ﬂexibly-zoned designation to the average or most-ﬂexibly-zoned within an area and
7Crime risk data come from CAP Index, Inc., who computes the crime score index for a particular location by
combining geographic, economic, and population data with local police, FBI Uniform Crime Reports, victim, and
loss reports. The index comprises the seven part one oﬀenses listed by the FBI: homicide, rape, aggravated assault,
robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. CAP Index supplies crime scores to businesses looking to relocate
or banks seeking automated teller machine locations. We match each property with the crime score index for its
latitude and longitude coordinates, obtaining a property speciﬁc crime score, rather than a county average or coarser
crime rate (see Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004b) for further discussion). The crime scores measure the probability
that a certain crime will be committed in a given location relative to the county level of crime. CAP Index provided
crime scores at three points in time: 1990, 1995, and 2000.
8We have also clustered standard errors at the census tract level and obtained nearly identical results. In addition,
clustering by year and removing year ﬁxed eﬀects resulted in even stronger results. Hence, cross-correlation in
the residuals appears to be driven more by correlation within geographic area rather than year. Therefore, to be
conservative, we assume group-wise clustering at various geographic levels and include year ﬁxed eﬀects throughout
the analysis.
18zoning category. There is a 20 (42) basis point drop in loan interest rates when moving from the
least to the average (most) redeployability in an area and zoning category. This result is consistent
with Prediction 1b.
Although not reported in Table 2, we ﬁnd that ﬂoating rates are associated with lower interest
rates of 63 basis points at the margin (t-stat = −13.18) and that a standard deviation increase in
leverage increases loan rates by 67 basis points at the margin (t-stat = 3.52). We ﬁnd no marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀects on loan rates from the other variables.
Since we include current value as a control, the coeﬃcient on redeployability reﬂects the eﬀect
of zoning ﬂexibility on interest rates that is unrelated to eﬀects embedded in the current value of
the property. This likely understates the eﬀect of liquidation value (through zoning) since current
price will likely be aﬀected as well by liquidation value.
Column 2 of Table 2 Panel A shows that properties with greater redeployability receive loans
signiﬁcantly more frequently. The dependent variable is the probability of a loan (i.e., whether the
property’s purchase was ﬁnanced with a loan, a binary variable). We estimate a linear probability
model to avoid making functional form assumptions and so that we may employ ﬁxed eﬀects for the
census tract, property type, general zoning category, and year which are generally inconsistent under
probit models, for example. We have also run standard logit and probit models without the ﬁxed
eﬀects that typically yield similar, and often stronger, results. The coeﬃcient on redeployability is
positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with prediction 1. However, this result is the only one that does
not survive the census tract ﬁxed eﬀects model (discussed below and shown in Panel B), so we are
not inclined to place too much weight on this result.
The third column of Table 2 Panel A examines leverage, or the size of the loan as a fraction
of the sale price, conditional on a loan being present. All of the control regressors are the same,
except, of course, log(sale price) is removed from this regression since the dependent variable is
already scaled by price. Conditional on a loan being granted, redeployability signiﬁcantly increases
the size of loans as well. Going from least to average (maximum) zoning ﬂexibility results in a 6.3
(13.6) percentage point increase in leverage.9
The results in columns 2 and 3 of Panel A provide support for Prediction 1: Assets with greater
liquidation values have higher debt levels. The results are particularly supportive of Williamson
9We report OLS estimates with robust standard errors assuming group-wise clustering at the zip code level.
Results are similar using the truncated regression models of Cragg (1971) and Powell (1986) with bootstrapped
standard errors.
19(1988) since our zoning ﬂexibility variable may be thought of as a measure of redeployability in
Williamson’s sense.
Column 4 of Panel A details results in support of Prediction 2 that loan maturities signiﬁcantly
increase with liquidation values. A move from the least to the average (most) ﬂexible zoning
designation within a neighborhood and zoning category results in approximately 1.7 (3.6) more
y e a r so fm a t u r i t yo nt h el o a n . G i v e nt h em e a nl o a nm a t u r i t yi nt h es a m p l ei sr o u g h l y1 9y e a r s ,
this is a 8.9 (18.9) percent increase.
In column 5 of Panel A we show that loan durations also increase with redeployability. The
result is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level despite the substantially smaller sample size for this
regression. (We require interest rate, duration and amortization data to calculate the duration.) A
move from the least to the average (most) redeployable property leads to an increase in duration
of approximately 0.3 (0.6) years. This provides further support for Prediction 2.
Harris and Raviv (1990) claim that when not conditioning on loan size, the promised yield
should increase with liquidation value (Prediction 4). This numerical result of their model is not
borne out by the data, however, as unconditional interest rates are also decreasing in redeployability
in unreported results.
Finally, Prediction 3 states that ﬁrms will borrow from one creditor when liquidation value
is high and from two creditors when liquidation value is low. To test this prediction, we regress
the presence of a second creditor on our redeployability measure. Column 6 of Table 2 Panel
A shows that assets with increased redeployability are signiﬁcantly less likely to be ﬁnanced by
multiple creditors, supporting this prediction. The diﬀerence between the least and average (most)
redeployable assets translates into a 1.8 (3.9) percentage point decline in the probability of multiple
creditors being present. Since the unconditional frequency of multiple creditor presence is only 12
percent (see Table 1), this is a 15 (33) percent decline.
B.2 Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects
In Table 2 Panel B we repeat the regressions in Panel A of loan characteristics on the redeployability
measure using census tract ﬁxed eﬀects. The local economic and social control variables we used in
Panel A are no longer appropriate, given our use of very local ﬁxed eﬀects. These tests make use
only of variation in zoning designations within a census tract, zoning category, property type, and
year. This should alleviate any concerns of unobservable variables aﬀecting our zoning measure and
20ﬁnancing terms and any plausible endogeneity story. Given the large number of census tracts (2,075)
in which our properties fall, a substantial portion of the variation in our redeployability measure
is eliminated by the inclusion of tract ﬁxed eﬀects. Nonetheless, the results described in Panel B
show that an increase in redeployability results in signiﬁcantly lower interest rates, higher leverage,
longer debt maturity and duration, and less frequent presence of multiple creditors. As mentioned
previously, the only result that does not survive census tract ﬁxed eﬀects is debt frequency.
The coeﬃcient estimates are actually slightly higher in the census tract ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
Within a census tract, property type, and general zoning category, moving from the least to the
average (most) zoning ﬂexibility lowers the interest loan rate by 27 (57) basis points per annum,
increases the loan’s size relative to the value of the property by 5.9 (12.6) percentage points,
lengthens the loan’s maturity by 2.8 (6.1) years, increases the loan’s duration by 0.17 (0.37) years,
and decreases the probability of borrowing from multiple lenders by 3.6 (7.6) percentage points.
These eﬀects are all economically larger than the estimates in Panel A, suggesting that potential
endogeneity or omitted variable bias is reducing rather than enhancing our estimates.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence for the importance of redeployability for loan
terms. Given two properties of similar type within the same census tract, the property zoned more
ﬂexibly typically receives a lower interest rate loan, a greater loan-to-value ratio, longer maturity
and longer duration debt and a loan provided by fewer creditors. These ﬁndings, and those in Panel
A, are strongly supportive of the theoretical predictions detailed in Section I.
B.3 Alternative speciﬁcations for current value
We argue that controlling for current value also controls for property or individual idiosyncracies
that may be related to ﬁnancing and zoning. The results in Table 2 control for current value using
the cap rate (current earnings over price) and the log of the sale price as a scale variable. Table 3
provides evidence on the robustness of the results to alternative speciﬁcations for current value. In
the ﬁrst and second rows of the table, we include, in addition to the log of the sale price and cap
rate, interactions of the cap rate with zoning category and property type dummies. The coeﬃcients
on redeployability (both with and without census tract ﬁxed eﬀects) are virtually unchanged and
continue to have statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the loan characteristics.
In the third and fourth rows, we add interactions of sale price with zoning category and property
t y p e si na d d i t i o nt ot h ec a pr a t ei n t e r a c t i o n s .O u rﬁndings are again robust to this speciﬁcation.
21Finally, in the ﬁf t ha n ds i x t hr o w sw ea d ds q u a r e da n dc u b e dt e r m so fl o g ( s a l ep r i c e )a n dc a p
rate to the regression along with all of the interactions above. The point estimates and statistical
signiﬁcance of redeployability are virtually unchanged.
Although not reported, we also conﬁrm that results are robust (and often stronger) to excluding
cap rate from the regressions and using just the sale price to control for current value. Since cap
rate information is missing from some transactions, we conﬁrm the results on the larger sample
not requiring cap rate information. We also conﬁrm that the results are robust to the smallest
sample that requires both cap rate and interest rate information across all dependent variables.
This ensures that the sample sizes are equal across all ﬁve loan characteristics (i.e., the same loan
contracts for every loan term).
B.4 Nonlinearities
Finally, we also check for the presence of non-linearities associated with our redeployability measure.
We regress each of our loan characteristics and price on dummy variables for every redeployability
value (there are 427 unique values) plus the full set of controls. We then take the estimated
dummy coeﬃcients from this regression, representing the eﬀect each redeployability value has on
the particular loan terms or price, and regress them on the continuous redeployability measure,
its squared term, and cubed term. Note that the errors-in-variables problem is not a concern here
since the dependent variable is the estimated coeﬃcient from the ﬁrst stage and therefore estimation
error of this variable will show up in the residual if unrelated to the regressors redeployability, its
square, and cube. For all six dependent variables including price, only the ﬁrst, linear term was
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (and positive) at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. This indicates
that the non-linear terms are rejected in favor of a linear speciﬁcation for describing the data.
The results provide strong support for the importance of redeployability on the form of the loan
contract. We ﬁnd that redeployable properties receive lower-interest debt, are ﬁnanced with larger,
longer maturity and longer duration loans, and are less frequently ﬁnanced by multiple creditors.
These results provide empirical evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions (in Section I) of
Williamson (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Harris and Raviv (1990), and Hart and Moore
(1994).
22C. Strictness of zoning, law enforcement, and liquidity
In Table 4 we examine whether the impact of zoning regulations diﬀers across jurisdictions. In
particular, one would expect that zoning regulations should matter more in areas with stricter
application of zoning rules, stronger overall law enforcement mechanisms, and more liquid markets
for redeployed properties. To test this, we repeat the regressions of Table 2 by interacting our
redeployability measure with variables designed to capture ease of manipulation of zoning regula-
tions, quality of local law enforcement, and market liquidity. Since these variables are all measured
at levels greater than a census tract, regressions using census tract ﬁxed eﬀects are not feasible.
However, as shown in Table 2, for many of our results removal of census tract ﬁxed eﬀects yielded
weaker ﬁndings.
C.1 Zoning strictness
In Table 4 Panel A we interact the redeployability variable with several measures designed to capture
the strictness of local zoning regulation. Our redeployability measure should be more important in
jurisdictions with strict zoning rules, and have less impact where adherence is weak.
We capture the strictness of zoning in an area via several measures from multiple data sources.
The ﬁrst two measures come from the Wharton Land Use Control Survey under the Wharton
Urban Decentralization Project (see Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)). We ﬁrst create an index of
zoning strictness for an area by taking the average of the percentage of applications for zoning
changes that were approved in the local MSA during 1989 (coded as follows 5=0 to 10 % , 4=11
to 29%, 3=30 to 59%, 2=60 to 89%, 1=90-100%) and the estimated number of months between
application for rezoning and issuance of a building permit for the development of a property in the
MSA, taking the average for single family units and oﬃce buildings (coded as follows 1=Less than
3m o n t h s ,2 = 3t o6m o n t h s ,3 = 7t o1 2m o n t h s ,4 = 1 3t o2 4m o n t h s ,5 = M o r et h a n2 4m o n t h s ) .
Appendix B describes in more detail the construction of this variable and its source. Interacting
the zoning strictness index with redeployability, Table 4 Panel A shows that property-speciﬁc
redeployability has a stronger eﬀect on loan characteristics in jurisdictions with strict zoning rules.
The interaction coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and of the predicted sign (standard errors
are clustered at the MSA level here).
The second zoning rigor measure we use is an index of the eﬀectiveness of growth management
techniques employed in the MSA through zoning ordinances and permits, also obtained from the
23Wharton Land Use Control Survey. Speciﬁcally, survey respondents’ assessment of the eﬀectiveness
of ordinances, building permits, and zoning ordinances in controlling growth are provided on a scale
of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) and the average across the three categories is the growth
management index we employ. Appendix B details the construction of this variable and its source.
As Panel A shows, redeployability has a greater eﬀect on all loan characteristics in jurisdictions
that use zoning ordinances and permits most eﬀectively to control and manage growth in the area.
This indicates that zoning ﬂexibility is a better measure of redeployability in areas where zoning
matters more and is adhered to more tightly.
As a third measure of the ease of altering zoning on a property, we employ a property-speciﬁc
indicator variable for properties with an historic zoning designation. We expect that zoning classiﬁ-
cations should be harder to change for historically zoned properties. Consistent with this conjecture,
redeployability has an even greater eﬀect on all loan terms other than duration (which has the right
sign but is insigniﬁcant) for properties zoned historic.
Our ﬁnal measure for zoning strictness is the fraction of properties in the same zip code that
have the same general zoning designation, zoning concentration. It is likely more diﬃcult to change
zoning when surrounding properties are zoned similarly. For instance, one of the major criteria in
getting a zoning change for a property is consideration for the zoning and use of properties nearby.
Thus, zoning redeployability may be a better proxy for liquidation value when it is more diﬃcult
to change zoning designations, as measured by the fraction of similarly zoned properties. Table 4
Panel A provides evidence that redeployability has a stronger eﬀect on loan frequency, leverage,
debt maturity, loan duration, and the presence of multiple creditors when zoning concentration
is high.10 Taken together, the four interactions in Panel A demonstrate that redeployability has
a substantially stronger eﬀect in areas in which zoning rules are more important and harder to
change.
10Regulation may be more binding when properties of a similar type are clustered in the same region and this
in turn seems to have a greater impact on ﬁnancing terms. This idea may relate to the literature on industrial
geographic concentration (e.g., Krugman (1991) and Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), which suggests that concentration
can create beneﬁts by facilitating scale economies for industry suppliers and reducing transportation costs (Lall,
Koo, and Chakravorty (2003)). It may be interesting to examine these implications for regional growth and ﬁnancial
development, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
24C.2 Enforcement of law
Table 4 Panel B examines interactions with variables that proxy for the overall enforcement of law
in an area. The ﬁrst is the number of arresting oﬃcers (authorities with arresting powers) per
capita in the county in which the property resides, obtained annually from the FBI from 1992 to
1999. This is a broader measure of the county’s commitment to legal enforcement. We include
state ﬁxed eﬀects in these regressions and cluster standard errors by county. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms with the predicted sign in all regressions. Loan frequency,
leverage, maturity, and duration exhibit a signiﬁcant positive interaction and interest rate and the
presence of multiple creditors regressions exhibit negative interactions between redeployability and
arresting oﬃcers per capita. These results suggest that the eﬀects of redeployability on all these
variables are stronger in counties with relatively stronger law enforcement, as proxied by arresting
oﬃcers per capita. Although the number of arresting oﬃcers is an endogenous variable, it seems
to be a reasonable proxy for the area’s commitment to law enforcement that is unlikely aﬀected by
the zoning assignment of a particular property.
Legal enforcement measures the ability of an administration to monitor the obedience of its
subjects. Conversely, corrupted local administrators might modify zoning regulations in favor of
special interests. In this case, zoning regulations might be subject to change even when enforcement
standards are high. To analyze how corruption might inﬂuence zoning, we use the number of federal
public corruption convictions per capita for the state in which the property resides. These data are
obtained from the Department of Justice from 1992 to 1999. We note that since these are federal
convictions they allow for valid cross-state comparisons. In particular, if federal enforcement is equal
across states, then we can interpret this variable as capturing more corruption in a state. If, however,
federal enforcement varies across states endogenously, then one should be careful interpreting this
variable as it could capture both supply and demand eﬀects. We feel that the assumption that
federal enforcement is roughly equal across states is a reasonable one. There is an adverse eﬀect of
corruption on the eﬀectiveness of zoning. We ﬁnd negative (though insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcients on the
interaction terms in the loan frequency and loan maturity and duration regressions, and a positive
and signiﬁcant interaction coeﬃcient in the interest rate regression. Since we only have cross-state
variation in the federal corruption conviction variable, these tests have low power. Nonetheless,
these results suggest that the eﬀects of redeployability are slightly stronger in less corrupted states.
25Although we interpret the variables with caution, taken together, these results are suggestive
of zoning laws being a better proxy for liquidation value in areas where they are more likely to be
enforced and perhaps less subject to the inﬂuences of corruption.
C.3 Market liquidity
Panel C examines interactions with measures of local market liquidity. The ﬁrst measure we em-
ploy is the average of the qualitative ratings by the Wharton Land Use Control Survey respondents
comparing the acreage of land zoned versus demanded across single family, multi-family, commer-
cial, and industrial uses, and across various lot sizes (coded on a 1-5 rating scale: 1=Far more
than demanded, 5=Far less than demanded). Appendix B details the construction of this measure
and its source. When demand for a type of property is high relative to supply, we would expect
the redeployment option to be of great use and to be exploited frequently. If, by contrast, land is
plentifully available then there should be little incentive to redeploy a property. The results dis-
played in Panel C show redeployability has the predicted stronger eﬀect on all loan characteristics
(insigniﬁcant for duration) when relative demand for land is strong.
The second measure of local market liquidity we employ is the Herﬁndahl concentration index
of property brokers within a 5 mile radius of the property. Liquidation of real assets is very costly
in ineﬃcient brokerage markets, and hence we would expect the redeployability option to be less
useful in such markets. More broadly, liquid markets should be expected to have more participating
brokers, and redeployability should be more cost-eﬀective in these markets. As predicted, we ﬁnd
that redeployability has less of an impact on debt frequency, leverage, debt maturity, and the
presence of multiple creditors when broker competition (concentration) is low (high).
Overall, the evidence in Table 4 demonstrates that our redeployability variable has a greater
inﬂuence on loan terms in precisely those markets where we would predict it to have a stronger eﬀect:
areas in which zoning rules are applied consistently and strictly, areas with stronger commitment
to law enforcement, and areas where demand for liquidated properties is likely to be strong. This
evidence buttresses our earlier results and supports the plausibility of redeployability (through
zoning) as a reasonable measure of liquidation value.
26IV. Other measures of liquidation value
In addition to our zoning measures, we employ other proxies for liquidation value that are more
subject to endogeneity concerns but that provide further supporting evidence for the importance
of liquidation values on ﬁnancial contracts.
For robustness, Table 5 reports results from regressing loan contract attributes on other mea-
sures of liquidation value. The results detailed in Table 5 Panel A use the full set of controls
described in Table 2 Panel A, while Table 5 Panel B reports results from regressions that include
census tract ﬁxed eﬀects as described in Table 2 Panel B.
As argued above, liquidation is likely a cheaper and more eﬀective option in competitive broker-
age markets. We employ the broker Herﬁndahl measure as a plausible (inverse) proxy for liquidation
value. In the ﬁrst row of Table 5 Panel A we show that properties in less competitive brokerage
markets receive debt less frequently, receive shorter maturity debt, and are subject to higher inter-
est rates. Since broker Herﬁndahl is measured over a 5 mile radius, there is little variation in this
measure within a census tract, hence the census tract ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation is not appropriate
here.
An historic zoning designation can also substantially reduce a property’s redeployability and
liquidity. Properties in historic districts often face severe restrictions on changes in appearance and
use. In the second row of Table 5 Panel A we analyze the eﬀect of an historic designation on features
of loan contracts. We ﬁnd that properties zoned historic receive signiﬁcantly fewer and smaller
loans, have higher interest rates, and are more likely to be ﬁnanced by multiple creditors. The
economic magnitudes of these eﬀects are large. An historic designation is associated with interest
rates that are 33 basis points higher, a 5.2 percentage point reduction in the probability of a loan, a
3.6 percentage point smaller loan-to-value ratio, and a debt maturity that is 3.1 years shorter. The
eﬀects on loan duration and presence of multiple creditors are statistically insigniﬁcant. As shown
in Panel B, the results are generally stronger when controlling for census tract ﬁxed eﬀects. Taken
together, these ﬁndings suggest that the illiquidity associated with an historic zoning designation
can have substantial eﬀects on loan terms.
As a direct (though endogenous) measure of liquidity, we consider the local volume of the
market, measured by the number of sales of properties in the same zip code. Though this measure
is subject to endogeneity concerns, we show in the third row of Table 5 Panel A that properties in
27areas with high local volume receive debt more frequently, larger loans, and longer maturities and
a r em o r el i k e l yt ob eﬁnanced by a single creditor. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that liquidation values are higher in high-volume areas.
We next consider zoning concentration, a variable that may also be viewed as a proxy for a
property’s liquidity. Valuing a commercial real asset requires knowledge of both property and
location attributes. If a property is of an unusual type for its neighborhood (for example, an
apartment building in a manufacturing district), there are likely to be few potential buyers who
have knowledge of both the neighborhood and the property type. The market for this property
is likely, therefore, to be thin, resulting in demand illiquidity (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).11 The
fourth row of Table 5 Panel A shows that zoning concentration signiﬁcantly increases loan frequency,
leverage, and maturity, and signiﬁcantly decreases loan interest rates.
To further study the eﬀects of liquidity, we examine the impact of population density in the
ﬁfth row of Table 5 Panel A. The population radius variable is the minimum of three miles and
the radius surrounding the property which encompasses 100,000 people. This variable is negatively
correlated with density and is proposed as a measure of illiquidity. We ﬁnd that properties in less
dense areas receive signiﬁcantly fewer and smaller loans, and the presence of multiple creditors
is more likely. More and less dense areas vary in many respects other than the liquidity of their
property markets, but the results nonetheless suggest that liquidation values impact loan contract
attributes in the predicted way. Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects are inappropriate for the local volume,
zoning concentration, and population density regressions because these variables exhibit little or
no within-tract variation.
The ﬁnal row in Table 5 Panel A considers the ﬁnancing of older (age of 30 years or more)
properties. Older properties are less durable and should have lower liquidation values. It is a direct
prediction of Hart and Moore (1994) that less durable assets should receive less debt ﬁnancing and
that the debt they receive should be of shorter maturity. We ﬁnd that older properties receive
debt signiﬁcantly less frequently and are ﬁnanced with shorter maturity and shorter duration debt.
Older properties are also much more likely to be ﬁnanced by multiple creditors. Given the presence
of debt, a property older than 30 years is more than twice as likely to be ﬁnanced by multiple
creditors than a typical property. These results are conﬁrmed in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions shown
11The local nature of commercial real estate markets is established in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004a) and further
explored in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003, 2004b).
28in Panel B.
Taken together, these results provide further supporting evidence in favor of the theoretical pre-
dictions linking liquidation values to loan contract features, though we acknowledge these variables
are more open to endogeneity concerns.
V. Liquidation value, asset prices, and broker activity
Finally, although the primary focus of our analysis is on the features of the debt contract, we ana-
lyze additional implications of the theories and additional tests on the usefulness of our redeploy-
ability measure by examining the relation between redeployability and prices and broker activity.
Recognizing these regressions, particularly for prices, are more open to endogeneity concerns, we
interpret the following results with caution. Nevertheless, the results are generally supportive of
our interpretation of zoning ﬂexibility as a measure of liquidation value.
Table 6 provides a test of Prediction 5 that an asset’s market value is increasing in its liquidation
value. In Panel A, we regress the log of the property sale price on our redeployability measure and
report the result in the ﬁrst column of the table. The regressors include current earnings as a
measure of property size and proﬁtability and the usual set of controls from Table 2 Panel A,
excluding log of price, of course. The regression yields a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient, indicating
that higher liquidation value is associated with higher market value, though as we noted earlier the
direction of causality in this price regression is not indisputable. Moving from the lowest to the
average (highest) level of redeployability in an area increases the market price by 1.5 (3) percent.
The results from the census tract ﬁxed eﬀects regression, described in Panel B, are very similar.
In the second column of Panels A and B, we regress the log of the residual sale price, in excess
of the log of earnings (essentially forcing the coeﬃcient on earnings to be one), and obtain similar
results, though with a slightly larger coeﬃcient. Interestingly, the results in the ﬁrst two columns
of both panels contrast with the general ﬁnding in the residential real estate market that tighter
zoning is associated with higher prices (Quigley and Rosenthal (2004)). This discrepancy may arise
largely from between versus within neighborhood comparisons. Our result that zoning ﬂexibility
i n c r e a s e sp r o p e r t yv a l u e si sp r o p e r t y - s p e c i ﬁc, relative to properties within a neighborhood and
census tract. The Quigley and Rosenthal (2004) results are between neighborhoods. It may well
be that zoning ﬂexibility is valuable for each property owner, but that the negative externalities
29of zoning ﬂexibility reduce property values at the neighborhood level. Also, as noted earlier,
endogeneity of zoning between neighborhoods is likely a concern (Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)), but
less so within neighborhoods.
We have presented evidence that assets with high liquidation values receive ﬁnancing more fre-
q u e n t l y ,a n da tb e t t e rt e r m s ,a n dt r a d ea th i g h e rp r i c e s . A n o t h e rb e n e ﬁt of such assets is that
they should be easier to market and less subject to ﬁre sales (Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Pulvino
(1998), and Stromberg (2000)). To test this hypothesis we consider the eﬀect of redeployability on
the probability that the seller of an asset hires a professional broker. Brokers reduce the time to
sale (Knoll (1988), Yang and Yavas (1995) and Williams (1998)) and assist in the provision of bank
ﬁnance to expedite the deal (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003)). Both of these functions are presum-
ably less important for assets with high liquidation value. In addition, Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2003) ﬁnd evidence that more liquidity-constrained sellers are more likely to hire a broker. To
test these implications we regress whether or not the seller hired a broker on our redeployability
measure of liquidation value and the full set of controls. We include as an additional control the
Herﬁndahl measure of broker concentration in the 5 mile radius surrounding the property. Diﬀerent
markets may have diﬀering levels of broker participation for a variety of reasons. We are interested
in studying the marginal eﬀect of liquidation value on the likelihood of broker usage, given the
ambient level of broker competition. Column 3 of Table 6 Panel A presents the result from the
broker presence regression. Redeployability has a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient. Panel B shows
that this result holds in the presence of census tract ﬁxed eﬀects as well. Properties with high
liquidation values are more often marketed without the assistance of a broker, either because they
may be purchased by a wider set of potential buyers or because buyers of these assets do not require
the aid of a broker in procuring ﬁnancing.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the breadth of theory on incomplete contracting for ﬁnancial structure, supporting evidence
is sparse. This is in part due to the diﬃculty in obtaining ex ante measures of asset liquidation
value and observing asset-speciﬁc contracts. We provide novel evidence linking asset liquidation
value, measured through regulation of zoning ﬂexibility, and debt structure using a unique sample of
asset-speciﬁc commercial loan contracts. Greater asset redeployability and higher liquidation values
30signiﬁcantly alter the terms of loan contracts in a manner consistent with theories of incomplete
contracting and transaction costs. More redeployable assets are ﬁnanced at lower interest rates,
receive larger, longer maturity, and longer duration loans, and are less likely to face multiple
creditors. Extending these results to non-debt contracts and loans without the non-recourse feature
may shed more light on the importance of contractual incompleteness and transaction costs in
determining the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
In addition to incomplete contracting theories of capital structure, our results also emphasize
the importance of collateral in ﬁnancial contracting and credit market rationing. While most
of the literature analyzes collateral requirements rather than collateral quality (e.g., Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and Wette (1983)), the eﬀect of collateral quality on credit rationing is a potentially
important question that has not received detailed empirical study. For instance, we show that
higher liquidation values and interest rates are negatively correlated (predicted by Bester (1985)),
yet we also ﬁnd that higher liquidation values imply larger loans. Thus, better collateral decreases
the amount of credit rationing as well as the cost of borrowing.
There is also a growing literature that analyzes the interaction between bank monitoring, loan
terms, borrower’s ﬁnancial structure, and liquidation value.12 Although we cannot identify bank
monitoring or related lending in the data, it may be possible to use our empirical identiﬁcation of
redeployability (zoning ﬂexibility) to test these models when measures of monitoring and related
lending are available. In particular, zoning designations themselves my represent hard information
but the strictness of zoning in an area may represent “soft” information only available to local
lenders. It would be interesting to examine the types of banks that use these two pieces of informa-
tion. Analyzing the role of collateral in the tradeoﬀ between credit rationing and pricing, as well
as the interplay with monitoring and relationship lending, may be an interesting avenue for future
research.
12See Gorton and Winton (2002) for a comprehensive survey.
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34Appendix A: An example of the zoning code from NYC zoning of residential districts
Table AI presents a detailed description of each of the residential zoning districts in New York City as an example of the variation in zoning
laws employed to capture liquidation values across real assets. A summary of the zoning code and the associated permitted uses of the
property as deﬁned by the code are reported for residential districts in NYC only. Similar measures are applied for the districts within the
other 8 broad zoning categories: organizations, waterfront, manufacturing, business, commercial, commercial/manufacturing, historic, and
residential and across all other zoning districts and cities in our sample from 1992 to 1999 covering 12 states and roughly 850 diﬀerent zip
codes.
Table A1:
An Example of the Zoning Code: NYC Zoning of Residential Districts
Minimum required lot Maximum number of
area (sq. ft.) dwelling units or rooms
Zoning Maximum ﬂoor Minimum required Maximum lot per dwelling per zoning per acre
Designation Uses area ratio open space ratio coverage unit room units rooms
R1-1 Single-family detached residence 0.50 150 - 9500 - 4 -
R1-2 Single-family detached residence 0.50 150 - 5700 - 7 -
R2 Single-family detached residence 0.50 150 - 3800 - 11 -
R2X Single-family detached residence 0.50 150 - 3800 - 11 -
R3-1 Single, two-family detached,
semi-detached residence 0.50 - 35 1040/1450 - 30/42 -
R3-2 General residence 0.50 - 35 1040/1450 - 30/42 -
R3A Single, two-family detached,
zero lot line residence 0.50 - 35 1040/1450 - 30/42 -
R4 General residence 0.75 - 45 970 - 45 -
R4-1 Single, two-family detached,
semi-detached, zero line residence 0.75 - 45 686-970 - 45/65 -
R4A Single, two-family detached residence 0.75 - 45 686/970 - 45/65 -
R4B Single, two-family detached
residences of all types 0.75 - 45 686/970 - 45/65 -
R5 General residence 1.25 - 55 605 - 72 -
R5B General residence 1.65 55 545/605 - 80 -
R6 General residence 0.78-2.43 27.5 to 39.5 - - 109 to 99 160/176 400/460
R7 General residence 0.87-3.44 15.5 to 22.0 - - 84 to 77 207/226 519/566
R8 General residence 0.94-6.02 5.9 to 10.7 - - 59 to 45 295/387 738/968
R9 General residence 0.99-7.52 1.0 to 6.2 - - 45 to 41 387/425 968/1062
R10 General residence 10 None - - 30 581 1452
Source: NYC Zoning Handbook
Notes: A detailed description of each of the residential zoning districts in New York City as an example of the variation in zoning laws employed to capture liquidation values across
real assets. A summary of the zoning code and the associated permitted uses of the property as deﬁned by the code are reported for residential districts in NYC only. Similar measures
are applied for the districts within the other 8 broad zoning categories: organizations, waterfront, manufacturing, business, commercial, commercial/manufacturing, historic, and
residential and across all other zoning districts and cities in our sample.Appendix B: Variable description and construction
For reference, a list of the construction of the variables used in the paper and their sources:
Redeployability (ﬂexibility of use): the scaled within zoning category and jurisdiction numeric
value associated with a given property’s zoning ordinance. For property p with zoning ordi-
nance A-n in jurisdiction j,t h i si s n
max(n∈P(A,j)),w h e r eP(A,j) is the set of properties within
jurisdiction j that have the same general zoning category A. Redeployability is the numeric
value indicating ﬂexibility of use n relative to the maximum ﬂexibility within a given property
type A and local jurisdiction j which sets the zoning code. (source: Comps)
Zoning category: dummy variables for the broad zoning designation of a property. For
property p with zoning ordinance A.n,t h i si sA. There are eight broad zoning categories
in the sample: organizations, waterfront, manufacturing, residential, business, commercial,
commercial-manufacturing, and historic. (source: Comps)
Zoning concentration (within zip code): for property p with zoning ordinance A.n this is the
fraction of properties in the same zip code as property p that have the same broad zoning
category designation A. (source: Comps)
Debt frequency: a binary variable for whether the property was ﬁnanced with bank debt
(occuring 71 percent of the time). (source: Comps)
Leverage: the ratio of total value of bank debt borrowed on the property to the sale price.
(source: Comps)
Debt maturity: the maturity of the bank loan contract in years. (source: Comps)
Loan interest rate: the annual percentage interest rate on the bank loan contract and whether
it is ﬂoating or ﬁxed. (source: Comps)
Multiple creditors: a binary variable for the presence of more than one creditor making a loan
on the property. Commercial properties have ﬁrst and second trust deeds (mortgages), where
the latter has lower priority claim on the real asset. These occur about 12 percent of the time
and indicate the presence of more than one creditor. (source: Comps)
Capitalization rate: the current or most recent annual earnings on the property divided by
t h es a l ep r i c e .( s o u r c e :C o m p s )
Property type: dummy variables indicating 10 mutually exclusive types: retail, commercial,
industrial, apartment, mobile home park, special, residential land, industrial land, oﬃce, and
hotel. (source: Comps)
Bank Herﬁndahl:t h eH e r ﬁndahl concentration index of bank loans being made to properties
w i t h i na1 5m i l er a d i u so fag i v e np r o p e r t y .( s o u r c e :C o m p s )
Broker activity: a dummy variable for whether a broker is involved in the deal, acting as an
a g e n to fe i t h e rt h eb u y e ro rs e l l e r( o c c u r i n g6 5p e r c e n to ft h et i m e ) .( s o u r c e :C o m p s )
36Broker Herﬁndahl:t h eH e r ﬁndahl concentration index of brokerage activity (acting as agents
only) within a 15 mile radius of a given property. (source: Comps)
Local volume (within zip code): the number of properties sold within the same zip code as
the property. (source: Comps)
Price variation: the cross-sectional standard deviation of capitalization rates on properties
within a ﬁve mile radius of a given property. (source: Comps)
Crime risk: A crime score index comprising the seven part one oﬀenses of the FBI: homicide,
rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The crime risk
scores measure the probability that a certain crime will be committed in a given location
relative to the county level of crime. Hence, this is a relative (within county) crime risk
measure. Crime scores are provided at three points in time: 1990, 1995, and 2000. Each
property is matched with the crime score index for its latitude and longitude coordinates,
obtaining a property speciﬁc crime score. Both the level of crime risk (relative to the county
level) and the growth in crime risk (change in relative crime risk from 1990 to 1995) are
employed as control variables. (source: CAP Index, Inc.)
Population radius: a measure of population density, which is the minimum of three miles or
the number of miles surrounding a property (latitude and longitude coordinates) needed to
encompass 100,000 people. (source: CAP Index, Inc.)
Population: the 1990 population (number of inhabitants) and the growth rate in population
from 1990 to 2000 for the census tract within which each property resides. (source: U.S.
Census Bureau 1990 and 2000).
Per capita income: the 1990 per capita income (total income divided by population) and the
growth rate in per capita income from 1990 to 2000 for the census tract within which each
property resides. (source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 and 2000).
Median home value: the 1990 median value of a home (in 1990 $U.S.) and the growth rate in
median home value from 1990 to 2000 for the census tract within which each property resides.
(source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 and 2000).
Zoning strictness index: the average of the following two measures from the Wharton Land
Use Control Survey (WLUCS), Wharton Urban Decentralization Project: the percentage of
applications for zoning changes that were approved in the local MSA during 1989, and the
estimated number of months between application for rezoning and issuance of a building
permit for the development of a property in the MSA. The ﬁrst variable is ZONAPPR from
the WLUCS – the estimated percentage of applications for zoning changes approved during
the past twelve month period in the MSA coded from 1—5 as follows: [1=0 to 10%, 2=11
to 29%, 3=30 to 59%, 4=60 to 89%, 5=90-100%]. The second variable is the average of the
following three variables:
371. PERMLT50 – the estimated number of months between application for rezoning and
issuance of building permit for the development of a subdivision of less than 50 single
f a m i l yu n i t sc o d e da sf o l l o w s : [ 1 = L e s st h a n3m o n t h s ,2 = 3t o6m o n t h s ,3 = 7t o1 2
months, 4= 13 to 24 months, 5=More than 24 months, 6=N/A].
2. PERMGT50 – the estimated number of months between application for rezoning and
issuance of building permit for the development of a subdivision of more than 50 single
f a m i l yu n i t sc o d e da sf o l l o w s : [ 1 = L e s st h a n3m o n t h s ,2 = 3t o6m o n t h s ,3 = 7t o1 2
months, 4= 13 to 24 months, 5=More than 24 months, 6=N/A].
3. PERMOFF – the estimated number of months between application for rezoning and
issuance of building permit for the development of an oﬃce building of under 100,000
s q u a r ef e e tc o d e da sf o l l o w s : [ 1 = L e s st h a n3m o n t h s ,2 = 3t o6m o n t h s ,3 = 7t o1 2
months, 4= 13 to 24 months, 5=More than 24 months, 6=N/A].
The zoning strictness index is computed as (5−ZONAPPR)+(PERMLT50+PERMGT50+
PERMOFF)/3), excluding MSA’s with 6=N/A. (source: Wharton Land Use Control Sur-
vey, Wharton Urban Decentralization Project, Development Regulation Survey Question-
naire, 1989. Also see Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)).
Growth management index:t h ee ﬀectiveness of growth management techniques through or-
dinances, zoning ordinances, and permits employed in the MSA obtained from the Wharton
Land Use Control Survey. The average of the variables GROMAN2, GROMAN3, and GRO-
MAN8 are employed as the growth management index. GROMAN2, 3, and 8 are quantitative
ratings by survey respondents of the eﬀectiveness of growth management techniques in con-
trolling growth in their community using ordinances, building permits, and zoning ordinances,
respectively. The rating is on a scale of 1—5 and is coded as follows: [1=Not important, 5=Very
important]. (source: Wharton Land Use Control Survey, Wharton Urban Decentralization
Project, Development Regulation Survey Questionnaire, 1989. Also see Glaeser and Gyourko
(2002)).
Demand-to-supply: the average of the quantitative ratings of survey respondents from the
Wharton Land Use Control Survey on the ratio of demand for land uses relative to the acreage
of land zoned for those uses across single family, multi-family, commercial, and industrial uses,
and across various lot sizes. Speciﬁcally, the measure of demand to supply is the average of
the following variables:
1. DLANDUS1-4 – quantitative rating by survey respondent comparing the acreage of
land zoned versus demand for the following land uses: Single family, Multi-family, Com-
mercial, and Industrial. [1-5 rating scale: 1=Far more than demanded, 5=Far less than
demanded, 0=No opinion or No reply].
2. DLOTSIZ1-5 – quantitative rating by survey respondent comparing the availability of
land zoned versus demand for the following single family residential lot sizes: Less than
4,000 square feet, 4,000 to 8,000 sq. ft., 8,000-10,000 sq. ft., 10,000-20,000 sq. ft., and
More than 20,000 sq. ft. [1-5 rating scale: 1=Far more than demanded, 5=Far less than
demanded, 0=No opinion or No reply].
38excluding zeros or no replies. (source: Wharton Land Use Control Survey, Wharton Ur-
ban Decentralization Project, Development Regulation Survey Questionnaire, 1989. Also see
Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)).
#Arresting oﬃcers per capita: yearly number of arresting oﬃcers (authorities with arresting
powers) per capita in the county in which the property resides from 1992 to 1999. (source:
FBI)
#Federal corruption convictions per capita: yearly number of federal public corruption con-
victions per capita for the state in which the property resides from 1992 to 1999. (source:
Department of Justice)
39Table 1:
Summary Statistics of Zoning Designations, Commercial
Real Estate Transactions, and Property Types
Panel A: Characteristics of properties across general zoning category
Debt Maturity Loan Multiple Zoning
Zoning category Number frequency Leverage Price (Duration) rate creditors codes
All properties 14,159 0.71 0.71 2,386,767 15 (6.8) 8.28 0.12 161
Organizations (O) 311 0.63 0.72 3,495,907 10 (7.9) 8.25 0.10 5
Waterfront (W) 6 0.67 0.85 4,887,500 15 (8.6) 7.00 0.25 3
Manufacturing (M) 3,188 0.68 0.72 1,807,378 10 (6.8) 8.73 0.13 25
Residential (R) 7,917 0.81 0.74 1,404,530 25 (10.0) 7.84 0.13 36
Business (B) 1,827 0.67 0.72 3,478,963 7 (6.4) 8.65 0.07 21
Commercial (C) 4,878 0.68 0.67 3,138,222 10 (6.9) 8.64 0.12 53
Comm./Manu. (CM) 252 0.74 0.74 1,003,192 10 (6.6) 8.74 0.19 4
Historic (H) 258 0.68 0.66 3,581,531 10 (7.9) 9.08 0.13 4
Panel B: Distribution of zoning category across property type
General zoning type (abbreviated), number of properties
Property type O W M R B C CM H
Retail 94 2 227 247 837 1,898 87 45
Commercial 35 0 107 127 218 749 31 68
Industrial 20 0 1,953 44 78 230 68 25
Apartment 28 0 253 5,860 110 383 12 65
Mobile home park 1 0 1 19 0 2 0 1
Special 10 0 5 176 18 47 3 2
Residential land 38 0 37 1,160 14 57 1 6
Industrial land 5 0 362 16 3 16 4 2
Oﬃce 74 4 227 233 520 1,396 38 27
Hotel 6 0 16 35 29 100 8 17
Panel C: Characteristics of properties across property type
Debt Maturity Loan Multiple Cap
Property type Number frequency Leverage Price (Duration) rate creditors rate
Retail 3,949 0.74 0.72 1,610,357 10 (6.6) 8.80 0.10 10.33
Commercial 1,650 0.40 0.68 1,670,517 4 (4.9) 8.97 0.07 10.38
Industrial 3,784 0.70 0.73 1,589,490 10 (6.7) 8.72 0.12 9.97
Apartment 6,997 0.90 0.74 1,529,293 25 (10.0) 7.77 0.13 10.04
Mobile home park 41 0.76 0.71 5,087,748 10 (6.8) 8.46 0.19 9.19
Special 290 0.70 0.77 2,109,284 10 (6.2) 8.88 0.20 11.00
Residential land 1,713 0.41 0.75 1,004,216 7 (4.1) 8.91 0.11 N/A
Industrial land 568 0.37 0.74 921,757 8 (4.8) 9.06 0.08 N/A
Oﬃce 3,380 0.67 0.68 6,595,045 10 (6.6) 8.60 0.10 10.17
Hotel 270 0.63 0.69 10,574,474 14 (6.6) 8.82 0.22 12.21
Notes: Characteristics of properties in the COMPS database covering the period January 1, 1992 to March 30, 1999 are
reported. Panel A reports the average loan frequency, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, sale price, median loan maturity and duration
(in parentheses) in years, loan rate (% per year), frequency of multiple lenders (second/subordinated loans), property age,
and number of unique zoning code ordinances for all properties and for each general zoning category. Panel B reports the
distribution of general zoning categories across 10 property types. The number of properties under each of the eight broad
zoning categories for each property type are reported. Panel C reports the average loan frequency, loan-to-value (LTV) ratio,
sale price, loan maturity (in years), loan rate (percent per year), frequency of multiple lenders (second/subordinated loans),
and capitalization rate (net income on the property in the previous year divided by the sale price, in percent) across the
property types.
40Table 2:
Asset Redeployability (Measured by Zoning Intensity of Use) and Debt Contracts
Panel A: Local economic and social controls
Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate† frequency Leverage maturity duration creditors
Redeployability -0.4569 0.1195 0.1475 3.8760 0.7048 -0.0428
zoning intensity of use (-2.25) (2.44) (3.03) (2.39) (1.87) (-2.00)
log(size) -0.1381 -0.0180 -0.9427 0.0391 -0.0138
(-5.15) (-2.85) (-4.40) (0.85) (-6.59)
Cap rate (current value) 0.0162 0.0087 0.0058 0.1488 -0.0176 -0.0029
(3.17) (7.87) (6.06) (4.10) (-2.03) (-7.23)
log(age) 0.0105 -0.0165 -0.0208 -0.2344 0.0473 0.0166
(0.48) (-3.12) (-4.76) (-1.51) (1.21) (8.13)
Bank Herﬁndahl -2.2856 0.8032 0.5307 -5.0467 2.5235 -0.0430
(-1.20) (2.18) (1.70) (-0.57) (0.84) (-0.34)
Price variation 0.0396 0.0359 0.0466 0.4127 0.1159 -0.0095
(0.44) (1.46) (2.36) (0.62) (0.54) (-1.12)
Population 0.0205 -0.0062 -0.0041 -0.5088 -0.0229 0.0057
(0.65) (-0.76) (-0.58) (-2.07) (-0.40) (1.97)
Population growth 0.0084 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0458 0.0010 0.0006
(1.52) (1.56) (-0.70) (-3.02) (0.06) (2.72)
Per capita income -0.0606 0.0105 0.0061 0.6837 0.0697 -0.0030
(-1.63) (1.44) (0.99) (3.70) (1.33) (-1.19)
Income growth -0.0038 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0096 0.0022 -0.0001
(-2.51) (0.28) (0.58) (-1.16) (1.02) (-1.19)
Median home value -0.0191 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0232 -0.0195 -0.0012
(-2.55) (-0.21) (-0.20) (0.32) (-1.23) (-1.09)
Home value growth -0.0175 0.0049 0.0008 0.1384 -0.0403 0.0005
(-1.04) (1.24) (0.23) (1.13) (-1.06) (0.40)
Crime risk level 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0001
(1.55) (-1.63) (-1.24) (-1.70) (-1.74) (1.86)
Crime risk growth 0.1090 -0.0180 0.0926 1.2362 0.7233 -0.0103
(0.53) (-0.34) (2.06) (0.79) (1.66) (-0.55)
Fixed eﬀects?
C o u n t y y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s
General zoning yes yes yes yes yes yes
Property type yes yes yes yes yes yes
Y e a r y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.10
Adjusted R2 (no F.E.) 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
# Observations 3,536 9,365 7,733 7,733 1,971 7,733
# Zip code clusters 602 848 796 796 533 796
41Panel B: Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects
Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate† frequency Leverage maturity duration creditors
Redeployability -0.6213 -0.0907 0.1365 6.6243 0.4001 -0.0831
zoning intensity of use (-2.06) (-1.54) (2.41) (2.87) (2.46) (-1.97)
log(size) -0.0949 -0.0162 -1.0173 -0.0203 -0.0017
(-3.40) (-2.75) (-4.29) (-0.71) (-0.43)
Cap rate (current value) 0.0133 0.0080 -0.0001 0.0751 0.0099 -0.0028
(2.57) (6.76) (-0.34) (1.58) (1.98) (-3.33)
log(age) 0.0041 -0.0118 -0.0123 0.0836 -0.0200 0.0135
(0.02) (-2.10) (-2.49) (0.39) (-0.79) (3.45)
Fixed eﬀects?
Census tract yes yes yes yes yes yes
General zoning yes yes yes yes yes yes
Property type yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.13
Adjusted R2 (no F.E.) 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
†Includes an indicator for ﬂoating rates, loan size (relative to sale price), loan maturity, loan amortization, and an indicator
for loans backed by the Small Business Administration.
Notes: Panel A reports regression results of the loan interest rate, frequency of debt, total leverage (ratio of debt to asset
value, conditional on debt being present), debt maturity, loan duration (based on the loan amortization length and formula
from equation 1) and the frequency of multiple creditors through second/subordinated debt contracts on a measure of real
asset redeployability, using the allowable use of the property given by its zoning ordinance. Additional regressors include the
log of the total sale price of the property (excluded from the loan-to-value regression), the capitalization rate of the property,
which is the current earnings on the property divided by the sale price, the Herﬁndahl index of banking concentration within a
15 mile radius of the property, the log of property age, local price variation (cross-sectional variation of capitalization rates on
properties within 5 miles of the property), the levels of population, per capita income, and median home value (all in logs) for
the census tract in which the property resides (from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses) as well as the recent growth in population,
income, and home value for the census tract from 1990 to 2000, and the current crime risk level and recent growth rate in
crime risk for the property’s location (obtained from CAP Index, Inc. for the crime index comprising the seven part one
oﬀenses of the FBI). The interest rate regressions also include the leverage ratio, an indicator for ﬂoating rates, an indicator
for whether the loan is backed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the loan maturity and amortization as
regressors (coeﬃcients are not reported for brevity). Regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects for general zoning category, property
type, year, and county. Coeﬃcient estimates for the constant and ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported for brevity. Regressions are
run under OLS with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level. Coeﬃcient estimates and
their associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported along with adjusted R2’s, including and excluding the ﬁxed eﬀects,
and the number of observations and zip code clusters used to compute robust standard errors. Panel B repeats the regressions
in Panel A using census tract ﬁxed eﬀects and excluding all variables measured at the census tract or coarser geographic level.
42Table 3:
Robustness of Redeployability (Measured by Zoning Intensity of Use)
to Additional Controls for Current Value
Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate frequency Leverage† maturity duration creditors
(1) Controlling for: log(sale price), cap rate (current value), and interactions of cap rate with
zoning category and property type.
Panel A of Table 2: Local economic and social controls
Redeployability -0.4606 0.1204 0.1475 3.7785 0.7753 -0.0417
(-2.28) (2.42) (3.22) (2.25) (2.02) (-1.92)
Panel B of Table 2: Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects
Redeployability -0.6047 -0.0965 0.1403 7.0316 0.8001 -0.0782
(-2.00) (-1.62) (2.46) (3.01) (2.46) (-1.82)
(2) Controlling for: log(sale price), cap rate, and interactions of cap rate and sale price with
zoning category and property type.
Panel A of Table 2: Local economic and social controls
Redeployability -0.4709 0.1089 0.1439 3.3949 0.7358 -0.0417
(-2.27) (2.19) (3.15) (2.01) (2.02) (-1.91)
Panel B of Table 2: Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects
Redeployability -0.6196 -0.0771 0.1403 7.4815 0.7917 -0.0784
(-2.04) (-1.28) (2.46) (3.17) (2.55) (-1.78)
(3) Controlling for: log(sale price), log(sale price)2,l o g ( s a l ep r i c e ) 3,c a pr a t e ,c a pr a t e 2,c a p
rate3, and interactions of cap rate and sale price with zoning category and property type.
Panel A of Table 2: Local economic and social controls
Redeployability -0.4826 0.0987 0.1450 3.1373 0.7204 -0.0447
(-2.33) (2.00) (3.16) (1.87) (1.97) (-2.04)
Panel B of Table 2: Census tract ﬁxed eﬀects
Redeployability -0.6399 -0.0791 0.1422 7.5363 0.7706 -0.0786
(-2.11) (-1.32) (2.48) (3.19) (3.00) (-1.78)
†Excludes all size variables since the dependent variable is the amount of debt scaled by size (sale price).
Notes: The robustness of the regression results from Table 2 to various speciﬁcations for controlling for current value are
reported. Three diﬀerent speciﬁcations for controlling for the current value of the property using current price, earnings, and
capitalization rates on the property and their interactions with property type and zoning categorical dummies are employed.
The ﬁrst row of each speciﬁcation includes the same regressors as Panel A of Table 2 to control for local economic and social
activity including ﬁxed eﬀects for general zoning category, property type, year, and county. Regressions are run under OLS
with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the zip code level. The second row of each speciﬁcation
includes the same regressors as Panel B of Table 2 which includes census tract ﬁxed eﬀects and is also run under OLS.
For brevity, only the coeﬃcient estimate and associated t-statistic (in parentheses) on the redeployability measure (zoning
intensity of use) is reported.
43Table 4:
Cross-Sectional Evidence on Redeployability Aﬀecting Debt Contracts
Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate frequency Leverage maturity duration creditors
Panel A: Interactions with strictness of zoning
Redeployability 0.4237 -0.4111 -0.5417 -24.5356 0.8227 1.1032
(0.40) (-2.06) (-2.36) (-1.92) (1.96) (3.58)
Zoning strictness index 0.6273 -0.1174 -0.1748 -25.3957 -0.0022 0.2470
(0.69) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-2.24) (-1.37) (0.45)
Redeployability × zoning strictness -0.4091 0.2252 0.3222 12.3838 0.0012 -0.5189
(-1.82) (2.42) (3.08) (2.40) (2.25) (-3.35)
Redeployability 5.4375 -0.4952 -0.9007 -13.8488 0.8181 0.7939
(3.56) (-1.82) (-1.65) (-0.35) (1.98) (0.88)
Growth management index 0.2033 0.0431 -0.1205 -4.0841 -0.0021 0.1699
(0.93) (0.32) (-1.36) (-1.39) (-1.37) (1.28)
Redeployability × growth management -1.3251 0.1245 0.2606 3.4291 0.0011 -0.1682
(-3.86) (1.99) (1.96) (2.14) (2.24) (-1.89)
Redeployability 0.8540 -0.1205 -0.0996 -3.6482 0.6445 0.2027
(1.88) (-1.31) (-0.80) (-0.83) (1.69) (1.56)
Historic 0.5197 0.0225 -0.1236 4.9454 -0.2323 -0.0223
(1.74) (0.26) (-1.30) (0.99) (-1.24) (-0.16)
Redeployability × historic -1.9869 0.2219 0.3050 11.2079 0.3075 -0.3126
(-3.84) (2.03) (2.26) (2.17) (0.59) (-2.02)
Redeployability 0.3299 -0.1046 -0.0596 -9.5892 0.2988 0.0421
(1.42) (-2.47) (-1.29) (-4.79) (1.52) (1.60)
Zoning concentration -0.2398 -0.0064 -0.0345 -7.4457 0.0415 0.0423
within zip code (-1.08) (-0.15) (-0.76) (-3.62) (0.99) (1.64)
Redeployability × zoning concentration -0.0709 0.1452 0.1678 16.5203 0.0168 -0.1002
(-0.18) (1.92) (2.16) (4.52) (2.12) (-2.28)
P a n e lB :I n t e r a c t i o n sw i t he n f o r c e m e n to fl a w
Redeployability 4.6329 -0.5127 -0.6944 -56.0970 -0.8020 0.8804
(3.46) (-2.02) (-2.59) (-3.64) (-1.16) (2.02)
#Arresting oﬃcers per capita -0.0254 -0.0735 -0.1091 -4.1719 -0.0581 0.1486
(-0.40) (-1.29) (-3.80) (-2.48) (-0.75) (3.00)
Redeployability × #arresting oﬃcers -0.6090 0.0799 0.1114 7.1704 0.2245 -0.1298
(-3.74) (2.54) (3.45) (4.03) (2.48) (-2.42)
Redeployability -0.4269 0.1273 0.1993 3.1544 0.7508 -0.1777
(-1.84) (2.91) (3.78) (1.31) (2.21) (-1.89)
#Federal corruption convictions per capita -0.0027 0.0012 0.0004 0.0236 -0.0029 -0.0011
(-1.32) (2.35) (0.71) (1.18) (-0.78) (-1.34)
Redeployability × #corruption convictions 0.0174 -0.0036 0.0012 -0.1580 -0.0066 0.0014
(2.27) (-1.56) (0.40) (-1.63) (-0.52) (0.39)
44Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate frequency Leverage maturity duration creditors
Panel C: Interactions with local market liquidity
Redeployability 1.0033 -0.2813 -0.1923 -11.7964 0.8275 0.4413
(1.52) (-2.37) (-1.46) (-1.65) (1.97) (2.50)
Demand-to-supply 0.0216 -0.1482 -0.0809 -4.3920 -0.0022 0.2684
(0.09) (-1.11) (-0.90) (-1.43) (-1.39) (2.19)
Redeployability × demand-to-supply -0.5855 0.1451 0.1359 5.7006 0.0013 -0.1811
(-2.34) (3.25) (2.72) (2.42) (0.27) (-2.26)
Redeployability -0.9558 0.2829 0.3785 16.0872 1.2165 -0.5219
(-2.04) (3.93) (3.70) (3.70) (2.38) (-2.81)
Broker Herﬁndahl 0.1127 0.6327 1.2790 30.2941 1.5040 -2.9041
(0.04) (2.06) (2.65) (1.26) (0.44) (-3.33)
Redeployability × broker Herﬁndahl 12.6525 -3.4476 -3.5324 -292.3673 -7.7877 7.3109
(1.47) (-3.01) (-2.00) (-3.36) (-1.31) (2.15)
Notes: Regression results of the loan interest rate, frequency of debt, total leverage, debt maturity, loan duration, and
frequency of multiple creditors on asset redeployability (measured by the intensity of allowable property use from the property’s
zoning ordinance) and its interaction with characteritics of the local market in which the property resides are reported. Panel
A examines interactions with variables designed to capture the strictness of zoning. The ﬁrst is an index of zoning strictness
which is the average of the following two measures from the Wharton Land Use Control Survey under the Wharton Urban
Decentralization Project (see Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)): the percentage of applications for zoning changes that were
approved in the local MSA during 1989, and the estimated number of months between application for rezoning and issuance
of a building permit for the development of a property in the MSA (average for single family units and oﬃce buildings). The
second measure is an index of the eﬀectiveness of growth management techniques employed in the MSA obtained from the
Wharton Land Use Control Survey. Speciﬁcally, survey respondents assessment of the eﬀectiveness of ordinances, building
permits, and zoning ordinances in controlling growth are provided on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important)
and the average across the three categories is the growth management index. The third measure of zoning strictness is an
indicator variable for properties with an historic zoning designation. The fourth measure is the similarity of zoning ordinances
on surrounding properties (zoning concentration), which is the fraction of properties in the same zip code that have the same
general zoning designation. Panel B examines interactions with variables proxying for the enforcement of law: the number
of arresting oﬃcers per capita in the county in which the property resides (obtained from the FBI from 1992 to 1999), and
the number of federal public corruption convictions per capita for the state in which the property resides (obtained from the
Department of Justice from 1992 to 1999). Panel C examines interactions with measures of local market liquidity. The ﬁrst
is the average of the quantitative ratings of survey respondents from the Wharton Land Use Control Survey on the ratio of
demand for land uses relative to the acreage of land zoned for those uses across single family, multi-family, commercial, and
industrial uses, and across various lot sizes. The second measure of market liquidity is the Herﬁndahl concentration index of
property brokers within a 5 mile radius of the property. All regressions include the regressors from Table 2, including ﬁxed
eﬀects for general zoning category, property type, county, and year as well as a constant, where robust standard errors are
computed assuming group-wise clustering at the MSA (for Wharton Land Use Control Survey data) or zip code (for all other
data) level. Appendix B details the sources and computations of all relevant variables.
45Table 5:
Other Measures of Liquidation Value and Their Relation to Debt Contracts
Interest Debt Debt Loan Multiple
Dependent variable = rate frequency Leverage maturity duration creditors
P a n e lA :L o c a le c o n o m i ca n ds o c i a lc o n t r o l s( f r o mT a b l e2P a n e lA )
Broker Herﬁndahl 1.1545 -0.1584 -0.0103 -5.0265 -3.3871 -0.6806
(1.88) (-2.15) (-0.12) (-2.70) (-0.62) (-1.94)
Historic 0.3268 -0.0516 -0.0363 -3.1052 -0.0784 -0.1136
(2.30) (-2.05) (-1.74) (-1.77) (-0.93) (-0.86)
Local volume -0.0015 0.0010 0.0008 0.0636 0.0050 -0.0030
within zip code (-0.73) (1.96) (4.04) (2.54) (0.52) (-2.92)
Zoning concentration -0.1583 0.0651 0.0154 1.5008 -0.1055 -0.0444
within zip code (-1.82) (3.65) (1.79) (2.05) (-0.31) (-1.57)
Population radius -0.0262 -0.0440 -0.0081 -0.1910 0.1371 0.0315
(-0.62) (-4.89) (-2.12) (-0.43) (0.71) (2.17)
Age > 30 -0.0165 -0.0356 0.0048 -0.6675 -0.4796 0.1326
(-0.48) (-4.42) (1.40) (-2.02) (-2.10) (8.61)
P a n e lB :C e n s u st r a c tﬁxed eﬀects (from Table 2 Panel B)
Historic 0.5913 -0.1085 -0.0490 -0.4942 -0.1109 0.1187
(3.17) (-2.27) (-2.17) (-0.39) (-1.93) (2.49)
Age > 30 -0.0208 -0.0319 0.0083 -0.6315 -0.4596 0.1108
(-0.49) (-3.92) (2.09) (-1.93) (-2.79) (8.95)
Notes: Regression results of the loan interest rate, frequency of debt, total leverage, debt maturity, loan duration, and
frequency of multiple creditors on other measures of asset liquidation value are reported. The ﬁrst measure is the Herﬁndahl
concentration index of property brokers within a 5 mile radius of the property. The second measure is an indicator variable
for properties with an historic zoning designation. The third measure is the local volume or the number of sales of properties
within the same zip code. The fourth measure is the similarity of a property’s zoning classiﬁcation to that of surrounding
properties, namely the fraction of properties within the zip code that have the same general zoning designation (zoning
concentration). The ﬁfth measure is the population density radius (deﬁned as the minimum of the radius surrounding the
property which encompasses 100,000 people or 3 miles). The ﬁnal measure of liquidation value is a dummy for properties
older than 30 years. Regressions in Panel A include the local economic control variables from Table 2 Panel A as regressors,
including ﬁxed eﬀects for general zoning category, property type, year, and county. Regressions in Panel B include census
tract ﬁxed eﬀects and the remaining regressors from Table 2 Panel B. Robust standard errors are computed assuming
group-wise clustering at the zip code level in Panel A. Coeﬃcient estimates and their associated t-statistics (in parentheses)
are reported.
46Table 6:
The Relation Between Asset Redeployability, Prices, and Broker Activity
Dependent Probability of
Variable = log(Sale price) log(Sale price)−log(Earnings) Hiring a broker
P a n e lA :L o c a le c o n o m i ca n ds o c i a lc o n t r o l s( f r o mT a b l e2P a n e lA )
Redeployability 0.9313 1.0823 -0.0310
(6.88) (10.84) (-3.89)
P a n e lB :C e n s u st r a c tﬁxed eﬀects (from Table 2 Panel B)
Redeployability 0.9208 1.0042 -0.0210
(11.41) (9.98) (-3.37)
Notes: The table reports regression results of various measures of liquidation value, demand and supply on the
redeployability measure (zoning ﬂexibility). Speciﬁcally, the log of the sale price (controlling for current earnings
on the property), and probability of hiring a broker (controlling for the concentration of brokers in the local area),
are regressed on the redeployability measure zoning ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst two columns contain the sale price results
where the ﬁrst column regresses the log of the sale price on redeployability and log of current earnings and the second
column regresses the log of the sale price minus the log of earnings on redeployability (i.e., forcing the coeﬃcient on
log(earnings) to be 1). Regressions in Panel A include the regressors from Table 2 Panel A, including ﬁxed eﬀects
for general zoning category, property type, year, and county as well as a constant and robust standard errors are
computed assuming group-wise clustering at the zip code level. The broker regression also includes the Herﬁndahl
concentration index of broker activity within a 5 mile radius of the property. Regressions in Panel B include census
tract ﬁxed eﬀects and the remaining regressors from Table 2 Panel B. For brevity, only the coeﬃcient estimate (and
t-statistic in parentheses) on redeployability is reported in both panels.
47Figure 1
Distribution of Redeployability (Zoning Flexibility)
The distribution of a measure of real asset liquidation value determined by a proxy for the asset’s redeployability measured
by its zoning ordinance is plotted below. The allowable use of the property within its broad zoning category and local zoning
jurisdiction, scaled by the maximum allowable uses within an area and zoning category, is the measure of redeployability. Higher
values indicate broader scopes of allowable uses within a general category and jurisdiction.















Summary statistics of the liquidation value measure
standard
mean median deviation minimum maximum
Redeployability 0.51 0.50 0.24 0.08 1
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